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FYROM, Slovene Presidents View Balkan Crisis

AU1603144894 Berlin DIE WELT in German 16 Mar 94 p 2

[Bernt Conrad report: "The Picture of the Balkans Is Tragic and Grotesque"]

[Text] Bonn—The presidents of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Slovenia, Kiro Gligorov and Milan Kucan, have called for resolute West European support for the young democracies in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. With a view to the turmoil of war in the former Yugoslavia, Gligorov says that a Balkanization of other European regions is imminent if the "Balkans are not Europeanized."

The two presidents were invited to the Rhine by the "European Dialogue Bonn," an association of leading politicians and journalists, to discuss the topic "The Road to Europe—Too Many Conflicts?". In separate talks they explained later to FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker what they had elaborated on with Bundestag President Rita Suessmuth as the discussion leader. Their basic substance was: "The present picture of the Balkans is tragic and grotesque. It is also a consequence of insufficient preparations and the inability to permit, under crossfire from different interests, the victory of the finding that in the closely intertwined relations of the modern world there is no longer room for local wars and that the aggressor's first step is checked." This formulation was used by Slovene President Kucan. Like him, Macedonian Gligorov also made it quite clear that the Serbs are responsible for the war. Both explicitly rejected a new division into spheres of interest as it might become possible by Russia's increasing activities in ex-Yugoslavia.

Gligorov appealed all the more urgently to his Greek neighbors to put, for their part, an end to the completely superfluous controversy with Macedonia, to lift the unjustified embargo, and to achieve a peaceful dialogue. "The problem of Macedonian-Greek relations is basically an irrational problem of an emotional nature. We depend on cooperation. We do not have territorial claims. We are immediately prepared to continue the negotiations on all questions without exception," the Macedonian president affirmed.

Both politicians claim for their countries a place with equal rights in the future joint Europe.

General Staff Chief Views NATO Relations

AU1803110594 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 15 Mar 94 p 13

[Interview with Army General Lyuben Petrov, commander of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, by Neneva Andonova; place and date not given: "Main Thing Now Is To Remove the Barrier Created by the Cold War"]

[Text] [Andonova] General, do you seriously think that Bulgaria will be the first state to join NATO if the Alliance starts to admit new members?

[Petrov] This is our wish and we would like to think that it will be so. To judge from the hospitality that we were shown at NATO Headquarters, and if the Alliance really expands, we could be optimists and believe that in the near future Bulgaria will receive a vote of confidence and will be among the first new NATO members.

[Andonova] Do you think that our state enjoys greater attention than the other Eastern European states?

[Petrov] I cannot commit myself to assessments as to who is in first place in NATO's eyes. It is the politicians who must follow and assess this. From my position as an observer I think that confidence in Bulgaria is strengthening daily in NATO's higher structures.

[Andonova] What do you think determines whether a state is admitted to NATO, the behavior of the candidates or international circumstances?

[Petrov] The admission of any Eastern European state depends on NATO's leadership. According to the Washington Charter it alone can propose and invite new members. Naturally, the activity of the candidates in strengthening the structures of international security is of exceptional importance. I think that NATO will also have other criteria, but I do not want to dwell on them—this is not within my scope of activity.

The main thing now is to remove the barrier created by the Cold War between East and West. We must stop seeing each other as enemies. Mutual reproaches as to who was guilty are senseless and obsolete relics, which we must forget.

[Andonova] Has the "old thinking" been overcome in the Army?

[Petrov] We are doing everything possible to overcome the image of the enemy, especially in the Balkan peninsula, and I think that we have achieved a lot. However, all the state institutions must work in the same direction. The contours of the past have not been fully eliminated.

[Andonova] Where do those contours still exist—at the level of the higher leaderships or at the lower levels of the army's hierarchy?

[Petrov] At all levels.

[Andonova] Do you see common denominators in the military, regardless of what specific country is involved and of what specific organization it is a member?

[Petrov] I fully agree that the military has similar criteria and assessments regarding security, and are equally concerned with the stability of regions that contain hotbeds of tension.

[Andonova] Is NATO seriously concerned with the Yugoconflict?

[Petrov] NATO is following with great concern the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and is determining its steps with exceptional caution. I can say that they are more concerned than the Balkan states. It may sound strange, but this is what I felt during my meetings in Brussels.

[Andonova] Is this the reason for NATO's increased attention toward our country?

[Petrov] Perhaps. They are interested in all the factors that could influence the conflict, and in the historical factors in the Balkans. They are carefully observing the behavior and position of every state in the region regarding the crisis. From this point of view we really are the object of increased attention. They assess our position very highly and do not hide this. I think that Bulgaria's principled position will have an important role in resolving the conflict.

[Andonova] Why is NATO more concerned than us with the Yugocrisis?

[Petrov] I have the feeling that people in our country think that foreign structures and factors will resolve the problem. The absence of an immediate threat prompts us to assume a calm posture, and this situation could play a bad joke on us at some given moment.

[Andonova] Our integration in the international security structures could be a gradual process. Do you think that from this point of view the Partnership for Peace initiative has a serious role?

[Petrov] The new partners must participate in the initiative in such a way that it could justify the very existence of the initiative. One cannot speak about integration through the initiative, but it will strengthen East-West confidence to a large degree.

The Partnership for Peace has a certain aspect, which justifiably causes concern among our public and other countries that have signed the framework document. We all want guarantees of our security, but the Partnership for Peace initiative does not provide such guarantees. Both the framework document and the invitation to participate point out that no guarantees are assumed. They envisage political consultations under NATO leadership when security is threatened, but this is no guarantee.

[Andonova] Our country must prepare a document on our participation in the initiative. Are you informed about the preparation of this document?

[Petrov] A supradepartmental commission has been established. Representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance are on it. The General Staff also has a basic role in preparing the national program. We must prepare a realistic and feasible program, even though our financial means are very limited. As you know, all expenditure on joint enterprises must be financed by the partners. The framework document allows every state to determine alone the degree of its participation. The commission is working hard and in the near future it will propose a draft to be submitted to the Council of Ministers and then parliament. Only then could we talk about real participation.

[Andonova] What does the draft contain more specifically ?

[Petrov] Naturally, certain enterprises could be eliminated from and others included in the draft. It envisages the participation of our military representatives in NATO's Coordinating Center in Mons—most probably three Bulgarian officers. We discussed this with the supreme commander of NATO Allied Forces, General Dowland [title as published]. They even expressed their considerations on the qualifications of our officers. We will also have representatives at NATO Headquarters—probably politicians or representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. On the basis of the national program our military and political representatives will make proposals and coordinate our participation in NATO. In addition to forums and consultations joint training is also envisaged. Since participation in such enterprises is rather expensive, at this stage we will restrict ourselves to minimal formations. We will begin at a lower level and gradually increase the scope of our participation. Actually, it is to early to reveal the entire draft program.

[Andonova] Is there good coordination between the General Staff, the Defense Ministry, and the military office of the president in deciding on participation in joint initiatives?

[Petrov] The Ministry of Defense has made a special decision to instruct the defense minister to coordinate this activity and propose a final draft.

[Andonova] My next question is "personal": Are there serious differences among the leading figures regarding our behavior toward NATO?

[Petrov] As far as a new element in our relations with NATO is involved—the beginning of partnership—it is normal to have differences regarding our participation in this initiative. One should not make any tragedy out of this. The moment the program is adopted it becomes a national program and thus obligatory for all the institutions involved. I cannot commit myself to assessing the various positions, but if everything is determined without comparing different positions we could not speak about democracy.

[Andonova] Are we left with any choice after joining the international security system, for example, outside the Partnership for Peace initiative?

[Petrov] So far we have achieved a lot on the bilateral foundation for strengthening confidence with NATO—with all states, including European states outside NATO. The Partnership for Peace initiative allows for cooperation on multilateral foundation and expands the scope of activities without restricting bilateral contacts.

[Andonova] With which NATO members will we have the most active contacts?

[Petrov] We will continue to develop our relations with our neighbors Greece and Turkey very actively, and also with Belgium. It is with Belgium of all the other Western European states that we have the best mutual relations and close cooperation. Confidence between us is at the highest level. One of our officers worked for three months on the General Staff of the Belgian Army. We have become acquainted at very close range with their military structures and the organization of their work. We have much in common in anything related to the number of population and the size of the army. We also have similar problems in implementing the reform—the Belgians are advancing toward a professional army. For the time being only the United States, the UK, and Luxembourg have such armies. All other countries only claim that they will advance toward this. Belgium is the first to make serious steps toward this and its experience will be very useful to us.

[Andonova] You also were received by NATO's political leadership, visited SHAPE—NATO's supreme headquarters in Europe—and met with the chief of the Belgian General Staff. What were the most important elements of your visit?

[Petrov] You see what the level of the meetings was—there was not a single secondary or unimportant talk. At joint briefings at the headquarters and the Supreme Command we were briefed in detail about NATO's structure and tasks under the new international conditions, and on the envisaged cooperation with the new partners. We briefed them on the progress of the reform in the Bulgarian Army. Actually, they are well informed about our military doctrine. We were flattered by the exceptionally positive reaction of specialists of the highest rank regarding the context of our military doctrine and its European spirit. In SHAPE in Mons we discussed with General Dowland and top officers future cooperation in the military sphere and within the Partnership for Peace initiative. The supreme commander himself showed us the building in which our officers will work. The offices, halls, and so forth are ready. Generally, I saw real soldiers and real professionals at NATO Headquarters.

My last meeting was with my Belgian colleague, General Charlier. We visited a mechanized brigade and were briefed on details related to its transition toward professionalism. We saw the training of pilots at air force bases. We also viewed the training of a "blue helmets" unit that will be sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Andonova] Were you informed about NATO's intentions regarding Macedonia?

[Petrov] We asked both at NATO's headquarters and in Mons what additional steps they envisage regarding former Yugoslavia. The answer was—"what the politicians decide." As all military everywhere, they will carry out any orders that they receive. We are no different—we too implement political decisions. In this respect I see absolutely no difference in our positions.

[Andonova] Do Bulgarian politicians have a correct attitude toward you?

[Petrov] I do not want to evaluate them. I have only one wish—that they really are more precise in working out their decisions.

Zhelev Spokesman Reaffirms Noninterference

AU1603144794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Text] We received a statement from a spokesman for the president, related to articles in today's Bulgarian newspapers which quote the Greek TO VIMA daily to the fact that President Zhelev was subjected to active foreign pressure.

The spokesman for the president recalls that President Zhelev was the first to determine the priorities of the new Bulgarian foreign policy and formulated the principles of the Bulgarian position regarding former Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria declared already at the very beginning of the conflicts to the west of our border that it will not take advantage of former Yugoslavia's difficulties and that it will not interfere in any military manner in the events there, and appealed to all other Balkan countries neighboring Yugoslavia to adopt the same position.

It is a fact that the Balkan countries are burdened by their past and any military interference on their part could become a precondition of a new Balkan war.

This Bulgarian policy is upheld by the president in all international contacts. It also figures in President Zhelev's correspondence with Turkish President Demirel, about which the Bulgarian public is well-informed.

The Bulgarian mass media are very clear regarding this position, even to such a degree that they do not think it is purposeful to repeat it constantly and thus assume the risk of becoming the target of their readers' ridicule, the president's spokesman continues. Nevertheless, one is puzzled by the attention they devote to the claims of a Greek newspaper, which are completely unfounded and unsupported by any facts or evidence, and which obviously pursue political goals which undermine Bulgaria's prestige, the statement of the president's spokesman reads.

Commentator on Ilinden Leader's News Conference

AU1403131194 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 10 Mar 94 p 6

[Commentary by Khristo Bardaliev: "I Had a Bad Dream About You, Dancho"]

[Text] The ways of Bulgarian democracy are strange indeed. In the name of some half-understood values and principles that allegedly guide modern society, we Bulgarians have been consciously dismantling our state for five years now. Now, all kinds of "parties" and organizations are unfurling their banners that are not only unconstitutional (and for that reason unregistered) but even openly declare that it is part of their program to split Bulgaria into an unknown number of components.

The Ilinden OMO [Ilinden United Macedonian Organization] is especially active in this respect. Despite not having any evident support in the Pirin region and being split into three mutually warring factions at the moment, the Ilinden members have the effrontery to give news conferences in the center of Sofia and to explain to the amazed fraternity of journalists what words like nation, minority, racism, and genocide really mean.

However, Ilinden OMO Chairman Yordan Ivanov committed a grave mistake. He demanded that the Bulgarian authorities, the army included, should pull out of the Pirin region, and then proceeded to utter threats against the Bulgarian majority in this region.

This proves that the gentleman in question really does not know his history, because when the official powers have withdrawn, this will leave only the structures of the VMRO-SMD (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies, a pro-Bulgarian organization] there.

As they say in these parts, "I had a bad dream about you, Dancho."

Ministry Official Condemns Zhirinovskiy Visit

LD1703223394 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 2130 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] Deputy Interior Minister Martin Fendrych described as a scandal the expected arrival in Prague of Zhirinovskiy. He declared that a man who talks about us as he does has no business being here. According to him, the Interior Ministry will look very carefully whether Zhirinovskiy violates the law governing the visits of aliens.

Military Said To Store Bacteriological Weapons

AU1803114994 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 17 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by Jan Benes and Lubor Kohout: "We Are Under the Threat of Bacteriological Weapons!"]

[Text] According to findings by CESKY DENIK reporters, a very dangerous species [kmen] of bacteriological and virological [virologicky] weapons are secretly stored on the Czech Republic's territory. Our country is a signatory to the Geneva Convention, which obliges us not to allow our Army to develop bacteriological or virological weapons, use them, or store them without international approval.

Within the framework of the former Warsaw Pact, the then Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was authorized to develop bacteriological weapons. A very secret site was designated for this purpose in the Military Research Institute near Techonin in the Orlicke Hory mountains. The Research Institute operated within the framework of the Military Medical Academy in Hradec Kralove. Scientists from other Warsaw Pact countries participated in the development and testing of these very dangerous and inhuman weapons. They were mostly from the former Soviet Union—from a Leningrad institute—Bulgarians, and others. CESKY DENIK reporters have found out that the species of the bacteria and viruses developed in Techonin had been stored in various places in the Czech Republic until recently. On other, unknown places, they may still be stored. This is not only a violation of the Czech Republic's international obligations, but also a criminal act—at the very least—of posing a public threat with unpredictable consequences.

It is very likely that in the Military Research Institute in Technonin species of biological weapons are still being stored, or have been destroyed only very recently. They are for example, a culture of cholera, the plague, smallpox, tularemia, meningitis, and the rare psittacosis.

Moravcik Outlines Priorities of New Cabinet

AU1703181694 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 16 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Prime Minister-designate Jozef Moravcik by Julius Gembicky in Bratislava on 15 March: "Consensus and a New Political Culture"]

[Text] Bratislava—*Shortly after Prime Minister-designate Jozef Moravcik had been officially entrusted by President Michal Kovac with forming a new broad coalition government, he granted his first interview to NARODNA OBRODA.*

[Gembicky] Mr. Moravcik, the coalition method of government is demanding because various political entities will directly influence it or will enter into it. Some of the parties—mainly the centrist ones—do not yet have clear-cut policies, which may make things difficult for the future prime minister, not only in seeking a compromise but also in ensuring that the cabinet functions efficiently as a unit. In this context, some experts are wondering whether the new government will be able to function as a compact unit or whether it will be divided department by department in accordance with the strength of the political parties, movements, and factions that entered into it. In your opinion, what would be the most effective way of reducing this handicap?

[Moravcik] We have to place emphasis on forming a collective that is mutually compact. That means that we are not attaching importance to allegiance to individual parties and groupings but to ensuring that a homogeneous collective is formed, which would provide a guarantee that not only the real obstacles but also the diverse points of view will be overcome, that there will be unity, and that compromises will be sought.

[Gembicky] What mechanism for a coalition agreement among the ruling entities have you decided to embrace?

[Moravcik] The basis for this coalition mechanism is and will be consensus. I firmly believe—and up to now we have always succeeded—that we will achieve a consensus, although it seems rather unusual. However, it has a very important side effect. It will help to unite the very divergent or disunited entities on our political scene. That is extraordinarily important for Slovakia at the moment. If we succeed, we can lay the foundations for a new political culture, which would be a good sign for Slovakia's political future.

[Gembicky] What positive activities undertaken by the previous cabinet would you like to follow up on, what would you like to improve, and what would you like radically to change?

[Moravcik] In my opinion, what was positive about the previous cabinet was its industriousness and assiduousness. We would like to inherit these qualities. However, they should not be undermined by the lack of a concept. That means that we should see to it that a firm line is established and that stress is laid on its execution. We would definitely like to improve this.

[Gembicky] Following your naming as prime minister-designate, you emphasized economic recovery as a priority for making your government's activity more efficient. How will that be projected into the mechanism for the functioning of the government and for the considerable personnel changes in the crucial economic departments?

[Moravcik] The team of economic ministers will actually be completed in the next few hours. Those negotiations are the most demanding because we all feel that the composition of the team is the pivotal point of the entire strategy from which the new government wants to proceed and that it wants to present to the parliament in April in its policy statement. For that reason, the negotiations have not yet been completed and, in this sphere, we are much more interested in the expertise than the political allegiance of the candidates for the ministerial posts.

[Gembicky] Do you consider it essential—and you personally, Mr. Moravcik—for your government to be only a temporary one or would it not bother you if it were in office until the end of this electoral term?

[Moravcik] We will keep to the generally accepted political agreement. The concept for the new government's work is based on this and, according to it, elections must be held this fall at the latest. We have sufficient means for pushing for elections at the end of September or the beginning of October. This is, in our view, the optimum date and we want to do everything to ensure that it is adhered to.

[Gembicky] How do you view effective cooperation within the trio of the most senior constitutional officials—the president, the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] chairman, and the prime minister?

[Moravcik] Regular meetings and an in-depth discussion on the most important issues before a decision is made is the basis for good cooperation. I think it could be a fundamental course of action that would guarantee the harmonization of cooperation and collaboration among the representatives of the aforementioned most senior constitutional institutions.

[Gembicky] On the basis of a political decision, however, the outgoing government refused to administer the affairs of one individual departments until a new government is appointed. What if NRSR Chairman Ivan Gasparovic, for instance, were to be governed by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's [HZDS] new political decisions and were to refuse to take part or if, as the case may be, he were to make effective cooperation in the president-parliamentary chairman-prime minister triumvirate difficult?

[Moravcik] At the moment, we are proceeding from the view held by those of us participating in the f mation of

the new government that as far as the National Council chairman is concerned, it is necessary to respect the fact that the HZDS has the strongest deputies' club. Therefore, we also intend to accept the fact that the chairman of the Slovak parliament is also from that club. Naturally, if cooperation were to be impeded and if it were necessary to alter this informal principle, then we have sufficient means for ensuring that we alter this situation.

[Gembicky] In your opinion, what kind of coordination should there be in foreign policy between the Castle, the government, and the Foreign Ministry, an area in which there have recently been, to a certain extent, glitches?

[Moravcik] I think that favorable prerequisites will now be created for ensuring that cooperation among all these constitutional entities is harmonized. I am well acquainted with the situation in the Foreign Ministry. My views on foreign policy are identical—in the fundamental principles—with those of the president. That is, there is a fundamental prerequisite for ensuring that our cooperation runs smoothly. Incidentally, this is merely a question of maintaining the best possible mutual connections, relations, and coordination. The means for doing so are in our hands.

New Defense Minister Questioned on Security

LD1703183394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Interview with Slovak Defense Minister Pavol Kanis by unidentified correspondent in Bratislava on 16 March—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Correspondent] Minister, what basic changes can be expected in your sector after you have taken office?

[Kanis] It would not be good to speak right now about what could be expected in the sector. I would rather stress that I would like to follow up the trend whose foundations have been laid by Minister Andrejcak. It is the trend of the Slovak Republic entering the European security structures.

As you may well know, I was the author of [word indistinct] programs of the Party of the Democratic Left, which were the first to push through the orientation towards NATO. This fact may have been taken into consideration in choosing a candidate for the post of defense minister.

[Correspondent] The Slovak Republic was more successful in concluding agreements eastward so far. Do you envisage any change during your term of office?

[Kanis] I do not think that the republic was more successful eastward as the Slovak Republic has achieved many successes in becoming closer to Western European security structures. I think that the decision on Slovakia's security orientation is unambiguous. We only have to find appropriate (?firms) and appropriate ways to implement this trend to strengthen the integration into Western security structures. It is a political as well as a military and financial issue.

[Correspondent] Do you have any conceptual solutions ready?

[Kanis] It would not be very appropriate to give you a positive answer. [passage omitted]

New Interior Minister Pittner Interviewed

LD1703160894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Interview with new Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner by Ivan Samel at Bratislava Castle following the swearing-in of the new government on 16 March—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Samel] Minister, what changes do you plan to take in your ministry?

[Pittner] First of all, we are going to create conditions, be they personnel or organizational, to ensure calm in the streets, to ensure calm in society as far as crime is concerned, as well as in relation to certain manifestations of hatred that can be expected at times of political change. My view therefore is that our task, rather than reorganizing the ministry, will be to take measures so that the citizens have the chance to prepare themselves in a free and democratic atmosphere for early elections and vote in accordance with their conscience.

[Samel] Does it mean that you are not planning any changes in the system, for example, in relations among the police, the Interior Ministry, and other relevant bodies?

[Pittner] It is quite possible that some changes will have to be made in the Police Presidium, since, in my view—which, however, is not very well-informed at the moment; I will need to have the situation analyzed—it has become bloated and has perhaps become, I am exaggerating now, a second ministry. [passage omitted] My aim will be to slim down the Police Presidium and ensure that it is effective and performs tasks necessary for the benefit of the citizen.

[Samel] What steps do you intend to take in connection with the investigation of the events of 14 March, when four journalists were assaulted in Primate Square?

[Pittner] It is a very serious matter. Alas, it was very irresponsible of the previous government to turn down the president's request that it remain in office until the new government was appointed; this meant that the police lost their top leadership, which must have influenced the way they acted. On the other hand, it does not exonerate those policemen who did not fulfill their duties. If it is proven that the accusations were true, or that they refused to help others because of political reasons or inclinations to different political views, the most strict legal measures will be taken in accordance with the law on the police corps. [passage omitted]

Defense Doctrine, National Security Texts

AU1603174794 Bratislava INFORMACNY BULLETIN in Slovak No 35/94 pp 1-11

["Texts" of the "Communique From the Slovak Republic Government Session on 1 March 1994," "The Slovak Republic Defense Doctrine" and "The Principles for the Slovak Republic's National Security," published in Bratislava by the Slovak Government Office Press and Information Department]

[Text] The Slovak Republic [SR] Government convened today for its 85th regular session under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

The SR Government discussed and approved a recommendation to supplement SR Government Decree No. 512 of 20 July 1993 on the proposition to accede to the Agreement on Resolving Disputes Arising From Investments Between States and the Citizens of Other States.

The SR Government discussed and approved a National Council of the Slovak Republic draft law that alters and supplements Slovak National Council Law No. 95/1991 on the Pro Slovakia State Culture Fund as amended by Slovak National Council Law No. 495/1991 and National Council of the Slovak Republic Law No. 562/1992.

The SR Government discussed and returned for finalizing the draft principles of a National Council of the Slovak Republic law on health insurance for railroad workers and the Railroad Health Insurance Company.

The SR Government discussed and approved with modifications a report on altering the statutes of the SR Government Council for Regional Development.

The SR Government discussed and approved a report on fulfilling the plan for the SR Government's main objectives for the second half of 1993 during the fourth quarter of 1993.

The SR Government discussed and approved a report on the expedition by the SR Government Office Department for Supervising the State Administration and Complaints of the notices, complaints, suggestions, petitions, and requests submitted by citizens to the SR Government Office in 1993 and a report on an investigation into complaints and information pointing to shortcomings in the management and economic performance of the Slovenske liecebne kupele Novy Smokovec state enterprise.

The SR Government discussed and approved a report on an inquiry into the management of state property administered by select communities.

The SR Government discussed and approved a report on the participation of a Slovak Republic delegation in the 37th session of the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in Vienna from 27 September 1993 to 1 October 1993.

The SR Government discussed and approved the Draft Principles for the Slovak Republic's National Security.

The SR Government discussed and approved a report on the measures necessary for establishing an SR Legal Representative Office for proceedings before the European Commission and the European Court for Human Rights.

The SR Government discussed and agrees with the draft Agreement Between the SR Government and the Romanian Government on Cooperation in Science, Education, Culture, and Sport.

The SR Government discussed and approved the draft Slovak Republic Defense Doctrine.

The SR Government discussed and approved a recommendation to permit exceptions, in accordance with Paragraph 45, Article 2 of Law No. 92/1991, in the conditions for transferring state property to other persons as amended by the changes and supplements enabling the Slovak Energy Enterprise Bratislava state enterprise to transfer free of charge 165 housing units to the Levice Municipal Office.

The SR Government discussed and approved a proposal to augment the Supplementary Protocol to the Provisional Agreement on Trade and Issues Associated With Trade Between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association and the CSFR of 16 December 1991 and a recommendation to amend the Provisional Agreement and the European Agreement on Providing Advantages in Mutual Trade in Fish by an exchange of letters between the European Union and the Slovak Republic.

The SR Government discussed and approved with modifications a proposal to grant remuneration to the members of the SR Railroads Administrative Council.

The SR Government discussed and approved the draft Agreement Between the SR Government and the United Nations Organization on establishing a Slovak National Center for Human Rights.

The SR Government agrees with the draft Agreement Between the SR Government and the Romanian Government on Preventing Dual Taxation and Tax Evasion in Income Tax and Property Tax.

The SR Government approved the draft Agreement Between the SR Government and the Romanian Government on Support for and Protection of Investments.

The SR Government made note of the following:

—the results of the talks of the joint European Community- Slovak Republic Committee held in Bratislava on 21-22 October 1993;

—the situation in payments relations between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic on 31 December 1993;

—the publication of the treaties and agreements concluded between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic and their bodies in the SR Legal Gazette;

—a projection for population development in the Slovak Republic up to the year 2015.

The SR Government discussed and approved a recommendation to de jure recognize the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and to establish diplomatic relations between the Slovak Republic and the former Yugoslav republic.

Bratislava, 1 March 1994.

The Slovak Republic Defense Doctrine

The Slovak Republic evolved as a modern, democratic, and European state. By their decision to establish an independent state, the citizens of the Slovak Republic also assumed the responsibility for defending their own interests.

The Slovak Republic promulgates the principles for its defense policy in a Defense Doctrine that expresses its enduring, political, legal, and methodological basis. The SR Defense Doctrine proceeds from the fact that the Slovak Republic does not perceive itself to be under an immediate threat, but that—in the current military-political situation—it reserves the right and capacity to defend itself against a possible military or nonmilitary threat.

The fundamental principles of the SR Defense Doctrine are:

1. The assertion of the Slovak Republic's national interests with the objective of guaranteeing its territorial integrity and the inviolability and unchangeability of its internationally recognized state borders. The Defense Doctrine proceeds from the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic in dealing with all the issues concerned with the state's determination to defend itself in harmony with the right to self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter. The Slovak Republic is not limited in its independence and autonomy by anything other than the sovereign right of other states and the commitments to which it has voluntarily bound itself.

2. The binding and non-conflictive nature of the defense measures executed and the policies pursued by the Slovak Republic with regard to the basic international legal documents and the principles arising from them. In particular, this involves the following principles: The rejection of a threat by force or the use of force; the obligation to seek a peaceful solution to problems and not to interfere in the internal affairs of another state; the obligation of states to cooperate with each other; the recognition of the equal rights and self-determination of all nations; the sovereign equality of states; and thorough adherence to adopted commitments.

The Slovak Republic makes no claim to greater guarantees for its security than it provides to other states. Under no circumstances will it initiate an armed conflict and it will not start one against another state. It has no political, territorial, historical, national, economic, or social reasons for doing so. The Slovak Republic does not possess or manufacture nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and it will not strive to own them. It will not permit the deployment or storage of these weapons on its sovereign territory.

The Slovak Republic does not condone the propaganda of war and armed force, terrorism, chauvinism, fascism, racial and class hatred, or national and religious intolerance.

3. Harmony between the Slovak Republic's domestic and foreign policy and security and defense policy, while respecting the specificity of its geopolitical position. The Slovak Republic will assert its national interests in a coordinated manner with regard to the international environment in the interest of lasting peaceful cooperation with all democratic states, with emphasis on neighboring countries, and with the aim of becoming involved in the formation of a cooperative European security system that eliminates military confrontation. The Slovak Republic is not forfeiting its right to take part in guaranteeing coalition security; therefore, it will try to join NATO and the Western European Union [WEU]. It is also not forfeiting its right to participate in UN activities as a guarantor of peace and security, especially as far as activities in the sphere of preventive diplomacy are concerned.

4. The general civil defense of the Slovak Republic. The defense of the Slovak Republic corresponds to its constitutional system. It proceeds from the affinity between the citizens' rights and obligations guaranteed by the SR Constitution. The defense of the republic is a matter of honor for each citizen. Citizens are conscripted in accordance with the law, but they also have the right to participate in defending the interests of the Slovak Republic and the state's democratic order. The impartiality of the military authorities is an element of the Slovak Republic's security guarantees. Civilian supervision of the military authorities—by utilizing the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy, which guarantees the army's detachment from partial political interests—is executed in its interest.

5. The commensurate size of the Armed Forces corresponding to the principles of defensive sufficiency and the need for a rational deterrent. The objective of the Slovak Republic's defense policy is to prevent war on the basis of the optimum composition of the Armed Forces and the resources predestined for defense or, as the case may be, to ward off an attack and to reestablish the situation prior to the onset of foreign aggression. The main task of the deterrent is to attain a situation whereby the risks associated with aggression outweigh unequivocally any conceivable advantages that a potential attacker could gain. Our doctrine is not offensive. The Slovak Republic's defense begins on its own borders and provisions are made for it throughout its territory. The

Slovak Republic will strictly adhere to the restrictions laid down by the international agreements on the numbers of personnel and main types of weaponry for Armed Forces. Furthermore, it will strive to reduce the number of personnel and conventional weapons with the aim of creating the prerequisites for improving stability and preventing the outbreak of military and non-military threats and conflicts.

6. Equilibrium between defense requirements and the state's economic, political, spiritual, social, and demographic potential. The Slovak Republic's defense needs give full consideration to the state's individual capabilities, which—in a fundamental manner—influence its defensive prowess, especially its economic potential.

The Slovak Republic is establishing sovereign Armed Forces to defend the state's sovereignty, its territorial integrity, and its democratic system. The president of the Slovak Republic is their supreme commander. The armed elements of the Interior Ministry and other public armed elements will participate—in cooperation with the Slovak Army—in fulfilling the tasks pertaining to Slovakia's defense. The Slovak Army is a vital element of the Armed Forces and is an important guarantor of the state's sovereignty and integrity.

The main role of the Slovak Army is, on the basis of ascertaining the preparations for a military offensive, to ward off a threat to the state's sovereignty by the timely adoption of essential defensive measures on its own territory; in the event of an offensive, its role is to repel an air and ground assault by the aggressor from whichever direction and in whichever part of the territory. Those forces that have penetrated the state's territory must be dealt with by the regular or mobilized forces with the aim of restoring the state's territorial integrity and sovereignty; at the same time, it is necessary to make use of the political-military support arising from the cooperative system of European security. In close collaboration with civil defense and territorial bodies, it is necessary to make provisions for the defense and security of the population and facilities important for the functioning of the state and also for eliminating the aftermath of extraordinary situations.

The Ground Forces, Air Force, and Air Defense Forces form the basis of the Slovak Army. The Ground Forces are made up of field troops, rapid deployment forces, and territorial defense forces. The Air Force and Air Defense Forces are made up of air bases with fighter, fighter bomber, transport, and helicopter units and air defense units. Their exclusively defensive character is stipulated in a set of laws on the state's defense.

The Slovak Army is vertically structured and centrally commanded. It has comprehensive logistical support at its disposal for defense. It can be mobilized according to need.

The preparation and training of Slovak Army troops is carried out on the principle of observing general legal norms and civic values; on the principle of developing personal responsibility; in the spirit of patriotism, impartiality, and the military regulations; and on the principle of the commanders' direct and indivisible responsibility.

In order to guarantee the comprehensive defense of the state and its ability to function in a war and in order to make provisions for the Armed Forces, a system of economic mobilization is employed, the Slovak Republic's state material reserves are generated and utilized, civil defense measures are implemented, and operational arrangements for the state's territory are carried out.

The principles for the SR Defense Doctrine are codified and detailed in National Council of the Slovak Republic legislative acts.

The SR Defense Doctrine is implemented by the bodies of state authority coordinated by the SR State Defense Council and under the direct supervision of the representative bodies, which consider or—as the case may be—approve the fundamental documents for the state's defense policy.

Crucial issues regarding the state's defense policy and the means for carrying them out are contained in the SR Government's policy statements.

The military-specialist part of the SR Defense Doctrine is detailed in the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the Slovak Republic, in documents on the structure of the Armed Forces, in the plans for the state's economic mobilization, and in the operational plans and other follow-up documents that are constantly actualized in harmony with the development of the military-political and economic situation.

Supervision of the implementation of the SR Defense Doctrine in the Armed Forces is provided by the National Council of the Slovak Republic via the National Council of the Slovak Republic Petition, Legal Protection, and Security Committee and also by legislation, the budget, and the supervision of executive authority.

The Principles for the Slovak Republic's National Security

The current security situation is the consequence of the fundamental changes that have taken place throughout the world recently. The Slovak Republic considers the transition from a bipolar world to the new multi-polar world to be its fundamental characteristic feature. The change in geopolitical conditions in Europe and throughout the world is leading to the collapse of some eastern-sphere composite states and to the formation of nation states. International relations have thus entered into a complicated period to which it is difficult to give a particular shape and whose time frame exceeds the year 2000. In connection with this, the role of the variable factors in the process of formulating and implementing the national interests of the individual geopolitical protagonists has increased. These are factors that

proceed from the processes involved in the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations and from their constant development, which is often complicated by unexpected changes. This fact is extraordinarily sensitive for the Central European region and for the new democratic states that are going through a complex period of radical social and economic reforms. The domestic political, economic, and social lability of these countries is augmented by the absence of external security guarantees.

It is apparent from the tenor of the international political situation that, first and foremost, the risks ensuing from the instability of the individual states and regions—from which threats and risks to neighboring states and regions may also arise—and not the risks stemming the end of the heterogeneous bipolar system of international relations are the predominant ones in Europe.

The security of the Slovak Republic is an element of the broader framework of European and global security. The Slovak Republic is reliant on its own forces; however, at the same time, it places emphasis on constituting new international relations. It is counting, first and foremost, on NATO, the WEU, the CSCE, and the United Nations in its objectives for finding more effective guarantees for its own security. Slovakia has a key interest in cooperation with and membership in NATO and the WEU in view of the fact that, at the moment, NATO represents a force capable of responding in time—by corresponding means and resources—to the new security risks and threats in Central and Eastern Europe. The Slovak Republic considers its active involvement in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace program, which operate significantly against the repeated division of Europe, to be an important starting point for achieving membership in NATO.

The Slovak Republic would like to contribute actively—by its membership in the WEU—to strengthening European security structures and to gain security guarantees of the highest caliber.

Cooperation with CSCE bodies, as well as activity within them, is important for the Slovak Republic from the point of view of its security interests. This involves an important Euro-Asian process, which the Slovak Republic considers to be the nucleus for a modern, cooperative security system.

The Slovak Republic accepts the United Nations as the supreme guarantor and global organization of collective security. It will also contribute in the future to making sure that the United Nations creates the conditions for averting conflicts and more effectively resolving local and regional conflicts.

The Slovak Republic considers stable, conflict-free, and correct relations with its immediate neighbors to be an important aspect for guaranteeing its national security. At the same time, it places a great deal of emphasis on intensifying and expanding economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation on the basis of the principle of "an equal with an equal" and non-interference in internal affairs. The development of regional cooperation plays a positive role in the Slovak Republic's security policy. It is striving to strengthen regional and cross-border cooperation in conjunction with this. It is interested in active involvement in the Visegrad Group as a political and economic coordinating forum for similarly oriented partners. It is also interested in the Central European Initiative, which can help to resolve many of the tasks of modern European cooperation.

In providing for the needs of its national security, the Slovak Republic proceeds from the need for equilibrium in its relations with all European states. At the moment, the Slovak Republic is achieving this objective especially by means of bilateral treaties. At the same time, it is aware of the positive role that the U.S. presence plays in Europe, and it is in favor of maintaining it.

The Slovak Republic is dealing with the ethnic minority issue and will deal with it on the basis of the civic principle in harmony with the CSCE and Council of Europe documents and the SR Constitution. It is, however, of the opinion that the tendencies toward irredentism and the internationalization of these issues, the casting of doubts on internationally recognized treaties by certain forces, and the abuse of history as an implement of current policy do not contribute to the stability of the Central European region.

The Slovak Republic's national security proceeds from its national interests. It represents a system of mutually complementary and cooperative elements and activities comprising an integrated system that creates the corresponding conditions for the natural economic, political, social, spiritual, and ecological development of the state. This system is guaranteed by institutions of a political, diplomatic, international-legal, economic, ecological, humanitarian, defense, and intrinsic security (police and special) nature.

From the point of view of safeguarding the Slovak Republic's external security, risks and dangers associated with the following are at the forefront:

—the repercussions from the utilitarian assertion of the interests of powers in the Central European region;

—the lability and ambiguity of political and economic development in some of the republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union;

—the danger of the internationalization of the armed conflict in the Balkans;

—the uncontrollable movement of weapons and military hardware, which is conveyed by various means to crisis regions;

—the possible tendencies toward increasing the weapons capacity in the Central European region above the framework exceeding the needs of defensive sufficiency;

—the manifestations of nationalism and the tendency to create ethnically pure states along with the attempt to revise the internationally legal framework for the current arrangement in Europe;

—religious fundamentalism associated, first and foremost, with Islam;

—international terrorism and internationally organized crime (drugs, money laundering, tax evasion);

—the activity of foreign intelligence services targeted on penetrating the state's domestic political, economic, and military structures;

—the problems developing outside Europe, especially in the Middle and Near East and Africa.

Despite the crucial role played by the external aspect of national security, the Slovak Republic is devoting no less attention to constituting the domestic dimension of its security.

Carrying out the defense of internal order and security falls, first and foremost, to the police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the judiciary. Other institutions, including local state administration bodies, community bodies, state enterprises, the private business sphere, and other organizations, including the security services, must play a more active role in guaranteeing this defensive function.

From the point of view of guaranteeing the Slovak Republic's internal security, risks associated with the following are at the forefront:

—the rise in nationalism and irredentism among a certain part of the population with possible tendencies toward violating the integrity of the state's territory;

—violation of the Slovak Republic's state borders in connection with the increased migration of the population from third countries;

—the evolution and anti-constitutional activity of extremist- oriented political organizations;

—the rise of organized crime and international forms of crime, including terrorism, blackmail, and drug-related problems;

—the rise in and seriousness of crime threatening the lives, health, and property of physical and legal persons;

—crime committed by high-risk groups with a tendency toward repeated offenses, alcoholism, drug addiction and a tendency to deal with such conduct by illegal means and resources;

—crime committed in connection with the privatization process and the transition to a market economy;

—the appearance of organized corruption in state bodies, especially in the police force, the Prosecutor's Office, and the judiciary as well as in local self-administration bodies;

—an extraordinary situation (natural disasters, technological accidents and catastrophes, and the risks and threats to the environment caused by military activity).

The aim of guaranteeing the Slovak Republic's national security is:

1. To multilaterally safeguard its independence and protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and the inviolability and unchangeability of its internationally recognized borders;

2. To intensify cooperation and achieve the Slovak Republic's gradual integration into the international economic, political, security, and cultural structures;

3. To bolster stability and peace with emphasis on the region of Central Europe. To make careful use of the opportunity to take part in peace missions, dealing with conflicts, and averting armed aggression;

4. To guarantee the state's constitutionality and internal stability, including respect for human rights and basic freedoms, the rights of the ethnic minorities, democracy, the functioning of a law-governed state, economic freedom, social justice, and responsibility toward the environment;

5. To achieve a standard of security for the individual and to protect the interests of society as a whole in a manner comparable with the democratic countries of Europe.

In guaranteeing its national security, the Slovak Republic proceeds from these main principles:

1. From undertaking responsibility for the state's overall viability. National security must provide guarantees for the Slovak Republic's general survival, its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its internationally recognized borders, and the functioning of a democratic regime. In view of the fact that the importance of the political factor in guaranteeing its security is increasing, the Slovak Republic is interested in achieving eventual membership in the European Union, NATO, and the WEU.

2. From consistency and equilibrium between the Slovak Republic's national interests and regional, continental, and global interests.

The Slovak Republic supports the creation of the kind of cooperative security system in Europe that would offer all states together and individually an equal amount of certainty. It ascribes a significant role in this to the CSCE.

3. From intensifying trust and the mutual flow of information in all spheres of national security in the spirit of the Paris Charter for a New Europe. The Slovak Republic will contribute to reducing the global and local risks of the outbreak of war, armed conflicts or, alternatively, to precluding the use of force or threat by force.

4. From protecting the Slovak Republic's economic interests. The Slovak Republic will actively contribute to removing discriminatory barriers and will support mutually advantageous economic cooperation with the aim of becoming integrated into advanced economic structures, first and foremost, the European Union and the European Free Trade Association.

5. From the priority of preventive activity in guaranteeing the state's domestic security. The Slovak Republic is interested in creating and implementing a pan-social system of prevention and in determining responsibility for its planning, organization, and development on a nationwide, regional, and local level. The Slovak Republic will create the necessary basis for a comprehensive, systemic, and coordinated course of action in guaranteeing the state's internal security on the basis of constitutionality and legality.

6. From limiting the factors that lead to the pollution of the environment. The Slovak Republic is providing for the sensible exploitation of exhaustible natural resources and guarantees the reliable operation of its existing energy, especially nuclear and chemical, and other capacities.

Despite the fact that, at the moment, it is not easy to determine the hierarchy of the individual aspects of security in the Central European region, it is evident that military-defense sufficiency fulfills an important role, because, in the final analysis, it demonstrates the state's existence and thus also the possibilities for exercising influence on the other aspects of national security. If the Slovak Republic is unsuccessful in realizing its interest in becoming integrated into the European security structures, it will be compelled to earmark sufficient resources to guarantee an adequate and resolute defense so that the Slovak Republic is capable of facing possible risks and dangers.

National Council Approves Privatization Bill

LD1803123594 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 18 Mar 94

[Excerpt] The session of the National Council of Slovakia continues in Bratislava. Our correspondent Renata Havranova, editor of the PRACE daily, has details of this morning's deliberations.

[Havranova] The Slovak parliament has again debated and passed the bill on privatization. After the fiasco suffered by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar when the parliament refused his idea of personal union of the government and the National Property Fund, Meciar had the law returned by the president to the parliament. However, the deputies confirmed the original decision, according to which the prime minister cannot hold the post of chairman of the presidium of the National Property Fund and the finance minister cannot hold the post of chairman of the fund's control board. [passage omitted]

Csurka, Csucs Cheered at Public Gathering

AU1603144394 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Mar 94 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Csurka: We Are at Home!"]

[Text] The reason people want Laszlo Csucs, deputy chairman of Hungarian Television, to resign is to have another excluded Hungarian. It makes no difference whether the government is behind the events in the radio. However, if it is not, then it should be ashamed of itself, Istvan Csurka, cochairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP], said in his speech. According to estimates, at the MIEP's call some 4,000-6,000 people gathered at Szabadsag Square [in Budapest] on 15 March.

Csurka was welcomed with flags in national colors and Arpad stripes ["arpadsavos," neo-Nazi symbol] and banners saying "We want Hungarians in television and radio!" and "Cheers for Csucs!" In his speech, he said that since 1848, the front has been lying between Hungarianness and foreignness, and now, "foreign mercenaries have reoccupied the public." According to Csurka, the liars have preserved their positions and their goal is to "spread the Marxist-Leninist system over the people." In his view, international financial support is behind the nation-destroying attitude. "We must not be afraid now: We are the majority, we are at home, and we have greater love for the homeland," Csurka said in conclusion.

The crowd cheered Csurka and Csucs for a long time, while some people shouted unprintable abuse at two young people wearing blue ribbons [symbolizing protest against radio dismissals].

Fidesz Official Views Election Prospects

AU1503151094 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 14-15 Mar p 9

[Interview with Laszlo Kover, head of the parliamentary group of the Federation of Young Democrats, by Zoltan Fekete; place and date not given: "The One Who Plays the Neutral Side Has a Good Chance of Falling"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Fekete] Everyone clearly rejected Viktor Orban's thoughts on a possible coalition including the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz] and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]. Do you think that the Fidesz is looking in too many directions simultaneously?

[Kover] I do not understand what it means to look in many directions.

[Fekete] It is certain that, with the exception of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], the Fidesz is regarding all the other parties equally....

[Kover] That is true, but this would be an unprincipled thing to do if one could be sure about a new government based on the Liberal Bloc, namely the parliamentary majority of the SZDSZ, the Fidesz, the Agricultural Association, and the Entrepreneurs' Party. Naturally, there are chances of such a coalition, but a professional political party has to prepare for all the political possibilities.

[Fekete] Even for a coalition with the MSZP?

[Kover] We have not closed down the coalition possibilities, either to the left or to the right. Fidesz Chairman Viktor Orban only said that, personally, everyone has his limits, but life will not stop in any party if a politician is unable to take certain measures without giving up his personal integrity. The same way, we leave the possibility open to the right, therefore in the direction of the coalition parties too. To the best of my knowledge, the SZDSZ says the same thing as we do, they only place emphasis on different things. This is not something unprincipled. We think that a political party that puts itself in the center cannot participate in a game on who cannot cooperate with whom in the future. This competition does not serve the long-term interests of Hungarian democracy. The MDF, the SZDSZ, the MSZP, and the Fidesz should compete on the extent of their flexibility in making sure that a realistic but efficient government program based on compromises will emerge in the next cycle. [passage omitted]

[Fekete] Viktor Orban, Janos Ader, and you are first-generation intellectuals. Who are the most certain Fidesz voters today: grandmothers or first-generation intellectuals mainly from the provinces?

[Kover] Opinion polls do not make such a strong delimitation; they can only evaluate the educational level and composition of a given group of voters. Therefore, although I am not quite sure, I can imagine that the first-generation intellectuals like ourselves sympathize with us. It is sure that the history of the Fidesz also speaks about their possibilities. However, all the opinion polls agree that, although we have voters in all the age groups, the percentage of potential Fidesz voters among young people is much higher than for other parties and, perhaps, this is only natural. [passage omitted]

[Fekete] A thirty-year-old leftist premier drifted Poland into a revolutionary situation in one year. Can you imagine that a considerable part of the adult population in Hungary will entrust Hungary to 30-35-year-olds, despite the leftist restoration condemned everywhere? Particularly in view of the fact that, recently, a journalist with a socialist daily said that they had made the Fidesz a big force, and they would also destroy it....

[Kover] I do not feel that the press might destroy us, but it is obvious that an intellectual civil war is currently being waged in the Hungarian press. Therefore, we reacted seriously to this declaration and we know that this had, and still has, very serious consequences regarding our popularity. However, we think that if

politics is not something omnipotent in a democracy, the press is definitely not something omnipotent either. Therefore, the Hungarian press cannot decide the election results in itself; this also requires the achievements of the various parties. [passage omitted]

Democratic Party Chairman on Election Prospects

AU1803104094 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 17 Mar 94 p 5

[Interview with Democratic Party Chairman Vilmos Bereczki by Daniel Bodnar; place and date not given: "The Democratic Party—They Would Cross the Threshold"]

[Text] The Democratic Party was founded on 4 September 1993. We asked Party Chairman Vilmos Bereczki, who used to be a deputy for the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP], about the Democratic Party's foundation and its chances at the parliamentary elections.

[Bodnar] You also actively participated in the reorganization of the FKGP. What made you create a new party?

[Bereczki] I did indeed participate seriously in the creation of a multiparty system and in the reorganization of the Smallholders' Party from 1988. It was clear to me that, among the parties that were emerging at that time, the ideas of the Smallholders were closest to mine. Unfortunately, this party later fell apart and, thus, I had to join the group of independent deputies in Parliament with the intention to engage in politics in a smallholders' spirit until the end of the current parliamentary cycle. I also accepted lobbying work in the course of my activity as a parliamentary deputy, and I presented various bills under discussion to the representatives of various trade union organizations and asked their opinions. A lot of modification motions emerged from this activity. The need then emerged for a party that deals with the real problems of society at the legislative level, a party that seeks a consensus and, at the same time, also controls the activity of Parliament and of the government to a certain extent. This is how the Democratic Party emerged.

[Bodnar] How would you characterize the Democratic Party?

[Bereczki] The Democratic Party is a program party in the center, and it is trying to give an adequate political answer to society's challenges. Within this, in the current situation, given that the challenges of the left are rather strong in Hungary, according to its program, the Democratic Party represent a bourgeois leftist trend, one similar to one wing of the Smallholders' Party before 1945. I think that our party provides an alternative in the sense that those who do not want to vote for a party that lies more to the left than we do can find a proper bourgeois organization in the Democratic Party.

[Bodnar] On whose votes are you primarily counting?

[Bereczki] We have recently enjoyed some success primarily to the benefit of the fallen middle classes. In addition, we have achieved results among people working in health care and welfare. Among our supporters, I can also mention the approximately 100,000 victims of the "bio-earthwarm" affair, whose interests no one dared to represent in Parliament, apart from myself.

[Bodnar] What is the financial situation of your party?

[Bereczki] We do not receive any government support at all. Our opinion is that we must return to the previous practice in which parties did not operate using taxpayers' money.

[Bodnar] Which parties are close to the Democratic Party?

[Bereczki] Primarily those parties that think that the players in political life should come to a certain minimum agreement. There can be opposing ideas, but not conflicts. We do not have any reason for this because, apart from the economic difficulties, no other pressure is being exercised on this country and, therefore, it is useless to be hitting, kicking, and biting one another. We must find a way to settle conflicts in a European way and, in our view, the fate of this country will be primarily decided on economic and social issues, and not issues that express superficial political helplessness.

[Bodnar] What election results are you counting on?

[Bereczki] I think that we will reach the 5-percent threshold in any case. We hope that many citizens who would not otherwise have voted will vote because of our appeal, because they are interested in all the things that we have already succeeded in achieving. I would like to mention here that my proposals were taken into consideration on the issue of increasing pensions, and the government's media proposal is also very similar to my original motion. We find it promising that our party has thousands of members, we have more than 200 organizations in the provinces, and a lot of people are asking to become members. I think that this definitely deserves attention in the current situation.

KDNP Presents Foreign Policy Program

AU1803082794 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 17 Mar 94 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Foreign Policy Program of the Hungarian Christian Democratic People's Party—a Lasting and Just Peace"]

[Text] With the approach of the parliamentary elections, the parties are presenting their foreign policy programs, and our newspaper is trying to regularly inform its readers about these programs.

The national minority policy of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] is determined by the key words of equality in chances, positive discrimination,

collective rights, and autonomy, Attila Zalan Csenger, head of the KDNP Department of International Relations, said in a lecture at the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Society on 16 March.

According to the program, in formulating its foreign policy guidelines, the KDNP aimed at supporting a lasting and just peace in Europe as a long-term goal, a peace based on the infallibility of man's dignity acquired through creation, human rights, and the right of all nations to self determination. Respect for man's basic rights is one of the starting points of Christian democracy, and this is the common basis of mankind's coexistence. The autonomy of nations is one condition for this and also the need to respect the personal conviction of other communities and the members of their own community.

Therefore, no country is allowed to violate the human and freedom rights by referring to sovereignty. The KDNP regards these principles as particularly important to "middle" Europe because this region will remain one of the biggest sources of danger until the end of this century and, at the same time, we must take into consideration the fact that the interest of Western Europe toward us will decrease proportionally with the instability of our region.

The security policy of the KDNP aims at avoiding wars and military conflicts and preserving peace. Therefore, we must try to fully make use of the possibilities given by the Partnership for Peace and the European Stability Agreement. Of course, the final goal of the Hungarian foreign policy continues to be the obtaining of full NATO membership.

According to the KDNP, Hungary does not have an outstanding border issue in the traditional sense of the word because our borders are determined by international agreements, but we still have to to a lot together with our neighbors to make our borders more open. The KDNP considers the stipulations included in the Helsinki Final Document as relevant to our borders. The Christian democrats are of the opinion that based on our common interests and values, we must become full members of the European Union, as the political, economic, and security corner stone of the new Europe. For this, we must give content to our association agreement and Hungary should submit its request for full membership as soon as possible.

Regarding the national minorities, the political and social organizations of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders have been created and have become stronger in the past two years. In connection with these minorities, Hungarian foreign policy should strive to support their principled and political goals with its moral weight.

Trade Deficit Widened in 1993

AU1603151594 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 16 Mar 94 p 9

[Unattributed report: "Foreign Trade Quick Balance—Exports Decreased, Imports Increased"]

[Text] According to preliminary figures on foreign trade product turnover, imports amounted to 1,162.5 billion forints at current prices in 1993, some 30 percent more than the year before. At the same time, exports amounted to 820 billion forints, 3 percent less than in 1992. The balance of trade closed with a deficit of 342.5 billion forints or $3.6 billion. All this has been reported to MTI by the Central Statistical Office.

The data also show that items that do not attract payment obligations represented a greater than usual proportion in the turnover. The delivery of fighter aircraft in exchange for the former Soviet debt, and natural gas imports to offset the investment at Yamburg belonged to this group. Deliveries of goods in connection with products manufactured under commission agreements, repairs, and leasing, and material contributions to businesses also amounted to a significant amount. Discounting these, the deficit can be put at $2.3 billion. In imports, Germany has been overtaken by the successor states of the Soviet Union and it is now in second place. On comparable prices, imports exceeded their 1990 level by 25 percent. Within this, the amount of machinery imports increased more than one and a half times. The purchase of the Boeing passenger aircraft played a big role in this. The import of foodstuffs increased by 30 percent, and the import of materials and other consumer goods increased by 10 to 16 percent.

Exports decreased by some 10 percent. Exports decreased by 20 percent in the first 10 months of 1993 but significantly increased in the last two months of the year. The decline of agricultural and food-processing industry exports can be gauged at 20 percent, while 16 percent fewer consumer goods were exported. The export of materials decreased by 4 percent compared with 1992 and the export of machinery increased by 3 percent.

Pawlak on Foreign Debt Reduction, Moscow Visit

WS1803104594 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by Aleksander Geryn; place and date not given;from the "Balance—Governmental Magazine" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Pawlak] The agreement with the London Club finalizes the main process of restructuring the Polish foreign debt. On the one hand, it has a very practical aspect pertaining to a reduction of the indebtedness level; on the other hand, a very important aspect is the adoption of a timeframe for repayments in a way that would take into account the realistic capabilities of our state budget which is the result of the economic and budget situations. It is worth stressing here that a rescheduling of repayments to the London Club is advantageous also from the standpoint of the timeframe adopted by the Paris Club. Thanks to the agreement with the Paris Club....[Pawlak pauses] One must stress that recently, the London Club agreement was negotiated by Dresdner Bank, and the role of the Germans in leading up to the successful finalization of the talks is worth stressing here. On our part—over the last six months—we undertook various initiatives, both on the official level and in informal contacts, to lead to a successful completion of the agreement in question. The agreement—while finalizing the process of restructuring the foreign debt—sends a very clear message indeed, that Poland is a stable country which meets its obligations, and that is one of the determining factors when it comes to possibilities for cooperation, including major capital investments. [passage omitted]

[Geryn] In January, there was the Prague meeting, in February—the Brussels summit, and in March—the Moscow meeting. In Prague, you talked about Partnership for Development. Is the Moscow visit a first step—as it were—on the way to implementing this proposal of yours?

[Pawlak] The visit to Prague was actually the first step, since we want to see Partnership for Development as a process that primarily makes our region dynamic—I mean the countries of Central Europe—and during the Prague talks with the prime ministers, we talked about several specific types of measures that could possibly contribute to making cooperation among the governments more dynamic. These talks pertained to a speeding up of the implementation of measures regarding a free-trade zone in Central Europe which encompasses Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republic, and Hungary. That was the first step. During the Brussels talks, we also made it clear that what we need is partnership-like and balanced cooperation. The most recent visit—that is the one to Moscow—constitutes a completion of the process. The point is to stress the fact that Polish foreign policy should be targeted in many directions, and it should be open to those partners who want to cooperate with us on a very practical basis. [passage omitted]

There is no easy way out of this, especially since right now, after a few years have passed, it is very hard to find the right conversion currency or to settle these transactions, and it is really not that clear at all who would gain more out of it given zero options. So what we wanted to do, was to concentrate on setting routine cooperation in motion. If cooperation develops dynamically and if we manage to sign agreements on contracts for delivery of strategic raw materials for many years to come, and if we adopt a trade protocol for 1994, then the results of these measures will make it possible to solve the problems of the past and of mutual debts more easily and more efficiently. These factors can definitely contribute to making cooperation more dynamic. Apart from that, we also talked about an infrastructure for cooperation and development broadly speaking—beginning with cooperation among banks to make settling accounts easier, to enable companies to get in touch with one another faster, and to make economic exchange safer. Another element is the construction of a pipeline to make use of the potential resources of our economies, as well as construction of a highway and a railway that would connect Berlin with Warsaw, Minsk, and Moscow. Those are the factors that the government can influence, and these possibilities will later be implemented by specific companies and people. That is also the general scheme of looking for measures that would constitute the Partnership for Development.

[Geryn] Mr. Prime Minister, you talked to your counterpart, that is Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and the conversation was quite long, outside of the binding protocol. What is your assessment of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin?

[Pawlak] I think what is very important is the practical approach to various issues. A very interesting conclusion from the conversations is that one can clearly see that the time we have wasted cannot be made up now or redeemed with any kind of money. And now, what is important is that when it comes to the practical side, one must move very clearly ahead, even if these are small steps. During the talks, we debated some principles of cooperation, then during plenary talks we agreed on specific measures and a timeframe for their implementation. During the talks, we came to a mutual conclusion that a visit by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Poland may take place in May, which may constitute the next stage in the practical implementation of various agreements and measures both by the government administration, and by specific companies, which would expand cooperation. I think that to go from a high level of grand ideologies down to the level of practical action, will significantly improve our mutual relations to our mutual advantage.

'Solidarity' Dissatisfied With Course of Strike

WS1703141294 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Report by B.I.W. and P.W.R.: "'Solidarity' Before Talks With Pawlak; Either Success or Protest"]

[Text] Members of the National Committee [KK] of "Solidarity" ["S"] are dissatisfied with the course of the strike action that has been carried out so far. At a session of KK it was stressed, among other things, that the protests are not sufficiently coordinated and that they started at the wrong time. However, the trade union does not intend to abandon the action, because it can see that the strikes "are softening" the government. If the talks with Prime Minister Pawlak, scheduled to be held on Friday [18 March], end up in failure, "S" might stage a one-day general strike. The greater part of the KK session was closed to the press.

To Be There Before Spychalska

"S" Head Marian Krzaklewski said that it would be enough if the talk with the prime minister lasted the scheduled one hour, or even 15 minutes, if Pawlak says that he will implement the "S" demands. If not, there is too little time.

An hour after the meeting with Krzaklewski, the prime minister has an appointment to meet with Ewa Spychalska, chairperson of the All-Polish Trade Union's Agreement. It can be expected that the "S" chairman will want to avoid a troublesome meeting.

The heads of all the regions and branches are supposed to wait in Warsaw for the results of the meeting with the prime minister. Should the negotiations end up in failure, "S" will organize a mass protest, declares Krzaklewski. Asked whether lignite mines will also participate in the action, he said that he did not know that yet, but he was just leaving for a meeting with the Strike Committee. The Lignite Section (its plants supply 50 percent of the country's energy) does not exclude the possibility of strikes if the government accepts the new popiwek [tax on excessive wage increases] bill. The union decided to start the sixth collective bargaining session with the government. This time the problem is the fact that the "Pact on Enterprise" is not being implemented.

"S" Pickets in Front of the Sejm

At 0830 today, "S" will start picketing the Sejm building, protesting the new popiwek bill. According to preliminary estimates of "S," participating in the protest throughout Thursday will be approximately 3,000 people, not counting the inhabitants of Warsaw. "S" announces that the picket will end only after the bill is either adopted or rejected.

Union members warned the picket participants to keep special calm, because on Thursday afternoon they would have to meet in front of the parliament building with the demonstration of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, protesting the metropolitan Warsaw bill.

Between 0800 and 1200, as part of the "S" action, gas stations will not be selling gasoline in Bialystok Voivodship. Gasoline will only be sold to ambulances, fire brigade vehicles, and so on. On strike will also be the Rzeszow and Radom Regions—the 2,000-person work force of the "Radoskor" is supposed to stop working for two hours.

Yesterday, local transportation workers in Katowice and several dozen plants in the Bydgoszcz region were on strike.

KK adopted the budget for the first six months. The union's receipts in that period (17.5 billion zlotys) will equal outlays. The greatest amount of money comes from dues—13 billion zlotys; it spends the greatest amount on salaries for KK members—5 billion. The union has also earmarked some money for the organization of the congress—1 billion zlotys, and for the work of the Constitutional Committee ("S" plus extra-parliamentary center-rightist groupings)—140 million zlotys. The budget was criticized, among other people, by Mazowsze Region Head Maciej Jankowski, because too little money was allocated for the organization of demonstrations and training.

"S" is indignant at the violation of human rights in China and will forward a letter to that government, in which it will demand that political prisoners be released. Signatures of "S" members will be collected on the letter. The union also criticized the behavior of the Polish delegation to the United Nations during voting on the resolution condemning human rights violations in China.

The next congress of the union will be held in Mielec.

Walesa Aide on Rosati, Pawlak Rapport, Strikes

WS1703133094 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0715 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Interview with Andrzej Drzycimski, press spokesman for President Lech Walesa, by Andrzej Woyciechowski at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Text] [Woyciechowski] Radio Zet's guest today is Minister Andrzej Drzycimski—good morning to you, sir.

[Drzycimski] Good morning to you, and to you, ladies and gentlemen.

[Woyciechowski] We know for sure now that on Tuesday [22 March], Prime Minister Pawlak will send the president a motion concerning the appointment of new Deputy Prime Minister Dariusz Rosati. What will the president do about the motion? Will he sign it, or not?

[Drzycimski] You know, I am not sure whether it will happen on Tuesday—that is the first thing. The other

issue is that at the point when the president receives the motion, he will then definitely talk to the prime minister, and he will deliberate on the issue. But so far, there has been no official document submitted to the president, nor have there been any talks that would concern this whole issue in a substantive way.

[Woyciechowski] But it so happens that the entire press is speculating on the issue. So let me put it this way: Does the president have any reasons not to sign the nomination?

[Drzycimski] He does not have any reasons but he just has to take a good look at the man since so far there has been a candidacy which by the way was talked about by the media, but as regards the person who is the most concerned here—that is the prime minister—there have been no statements apart from a general statement that the president is familiar with such a candidacy. So I think that once the candidacy is officially presented, then the president will think about ....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Has it happened before that the president did not sign such a motion for appointment of a deputy prime minister or a minister?

[Drzycimski] Well, yes, I mean not when it comes to a deputy prime minister but there was the famous case of the minister of culture. That happened in the past. The president did not sign the motion, and that caused a specific political situation. So when it comes to that, the president will also try to assess [words indistinct]

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] But do you think he will tend to sign it, or not? Is he willing to sign it? What is the situation?

[Drzycimski] You know, I never speak in terms of whether somebody could probably tend to do this or that since the decision in this case must be carefully deliberated by the president and therefore he has to have more information. We really do not know a lot about Mr. Rosati, I mean Professor Rosati. He is someone who is getting a lot of publicity currently from the mass media, he himself is outspoken, he presents his views. The issue requires a careful approach. The president never undertakes such things ....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] You mean he never signs anything immediately but takes some time to think about it?

[Drzycimski] I mean he never does things that have not been thought through. Sometimes he signs something right away but then it has been thought through. But when it comes to Mr. Rosati, we actually do not know much.

[Woyciechowski] And what will he do [words indistinct]

[Drzycimski] This is even more so since Professor Rosati was abroad for the entire period when the main transformations were taking place in Poland. And so it is difficult to say right away whether someone knows his activities. We do not know a lot about this.

[Woyciechowski] And what about the budget? That is another document which needs to be signed by the president. And there are huge speculations going on as to whether he will sign it or not.

[Drzycimski] That is [hesitating] one of the big problems created by subsequent governing teams. Parliaments and governments take quite an easy-going approach to this, and then they leave it to the president to make the final decision, and they are positive that he will make a judicious decision, and so forth. I must say that the budget is ....[Drzycimski pauses] Generally speaking, a situation of social tension has been created about the state budget, since the whole election campaign in September was under slogans like: It Doesn't Have To Be That Way, It Shouldn't Be That Way, The Budget Must Be Changed, in other words that the budget be prosocial. All these are election slogans. And in practical terms, the budget—presented to the parliament and going through subsequent stages there—has not changed much apart from a few minor revisions, in comparison with what the previous governments had established and worked out regarding the entire concept. So one can say that all these enormous social hopes that had been aroused, were not reflected in the budget.

[Woyciechowski] You mean the budget is not a fulfillment of election promises?

[Drzycimski] Yes. And so the president is asking the question: What is the situation? Are society's hopes to be frustrated once again? Is the issue to be approached light-heartedly again, something along the lines of election promises and their implementation by a specific political coalition? That is why this is a difficult problem for the president since he has to view it from two perspectives: In political terms, I mean in terms that society had a right to expect because society had been presented with a change of a certain economic concept, and that change was not implemented in practice. The president's other problem—I mean sort of in reverse—is that the president is familiar with the state of the country and its budget, and he knows that when it comes to this budget, one cannot make many radical moves, as it were. That is a dilemma for a politician who must make difficult decisions, and they are difficult also for him.

[Woyciechowski] But that is a moral dilemma. What would happen politically speaking if the president refused to sign the budget? What are the consequences of [words indistinct]

[Drzycimski] The consequences are that the budget goes back to the parliament, and then it can be voted through again, and then once there are two-thirds of the votes, then the president must sign it. There were such cases in the past where the president vetoed a law and it went back to the parliament, and that proves that the president pays attention ....[pauses] Let me remind you that the problem of Electoral Law for instance was vetoed by

the president and there was a big debate whether he can do it or not. The law was voted through anyway, and one must pay attention to how this influences the current situation, with this kind of political configuration.

[Woyciechowski] About Prime Minister Pawlak's Moscow visit. Is the president still surprised, and is he happy with the outcome of the visit? Has the prime minister presented a report yet?

[Drzycimski] I mean, as far as I know, the prime minister has not paid a visit to the president as yet. I mean, I know for sure that he has not seen him, but whether he has called him on the telephone—as far as I know, he has not done so yet, unless he did it very recently, but as far as late last night is concerned, that did not happen.

The president was surprised by something else—I mean generally he was aware of the visit—but he was surprised that the prime minister failed to report to him personally on what the situation is, I mean in terms of the goal of the visit. When the prime minister goes on a foreign trip, political issues always come to the surface, and that is why the president stressed that when it comes to the supreme state agencies, there should be large-scale coordination. In every case concerning foreign policy, he has always consulted with Minister Skubiszewski—it has never happened otherwise. And right now, he does the same with Minister Olechowski since the president thinks that of course he bears the constitutional responsibility for the general strategy as president, but when it comes to practical implementation, there is a specialized governmental agency to do that—that is the Foreign Ministry which carries out the implementation. So the ministry knows about what is the best solution in terms of political configurations, timing, and selection of countries. That is very much observed by the president.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Prime Minister—I am sorry: Mr. Minister—why did the prime minister not conduct any consultations? Did he just forget? Or did he rebel?

[Drzycimski] No, no, that was simply regarded a bit like ....[pauses] Anyway, that was cleared up quickly.

[Woyciechowski] So he forgot?

[Drzycimski] It was regarded as something to be taken for granted. There is the ministry, and it transferred [sentence as heard]. But the president expects that in such situations, some mutual consultations be conducted, and this is even more so since the president always invites government representatives to participate in his every trip. I emphasize that he does not have to do that.

[Woyciechowski] The prime minister did not invite representatives of the president's office...

[Drzycimski, interrupting] No, that is not the problem. All I am saying is that the president wants everything that he takes care of in the state to be handled by specific ministries, specific ministers. They take, as it were, specific issues into their own hands and decide whether these or those solutions can be achieved. As a rule, the economic ministers are invited, but not only. In Ukraine, for example, the culture minister participated in the visit. It all depends on the character of the visit. However, the president always assumes that it is very good when there is close rapport between the president and the government, when there is no misunderstanding. The president believes that the government should see what the president discussed, which issues were tackled. Let us take the recent visit to India, for instance. The visit was rather scantily discussed by the Polish mass media; however, I must say that on that Indian subcontinent it really hit the headlines, both on television and in the press. During that visit the president was accompanied by three ministers: foreign affairs minister, industry minister, and foreign economic cooperation minister. Participating in the visit was also a group of ten entrepreneurs who represented the greatest commercial, economic centers which want to enter the Indian market, or which are already operating there. You know, there is an awareness that this is all conducted as a joint activity.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Minister, how does the Belvedere evaluate the Moscow trip? Was it just a minor incident or have relations with Prime Minister Pawlak, which have so far been excellent, begun to deteriorate?

[Drzycimski] Do we think so?

[Woyciechowski] Yes.

[Drzycimski] No, certainly not.

[Woyciechowski] It was just a minor thing, was it not?

[Drzycimski] It was a technical issue, all the more so because, as I said, during the visit that the prime minister paid to the president a day before his departure, these issues were...

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] They were explained?

[Drzycimski] Yes, they were explained. In addition, the prime minister presented very detailed main points of the visit; this was very important, because the prime minister decided that the visit and the talks should supplement the presidential agreements with specifics. This is what we really need: openness is everywhere, but we should get deeper into things, especially into the economic issues. I hear that a lot has been achieved in this area. I believe this will be a very important visit as it may open the Russian market.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Minister, have you already read the 68-page report by the National Council of Radio and Television?

[Drzycimski] No, I have not. This report is currently on the president's desk. I saw him going through it rather thoroughly.

[Woyciechowski] What will become of the council? What do you think?

[Drzycimski] The president delicately presented his stand. He presented his own remarks and concerns. As president, who feels responsible for what is happening in the country—also responsible for the democratic transformations in the mass media—he stated his views. He believed that certain decisions had been made too hastily; he did make that clear. It also seems that these issues will sooner or later be brought up again and again: Free mass media, free press, free radio, and free television. I believe that these issues will be brought up, that all the issues of social concern will be presented. The president had information which needed to be thought over. I do not...

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] He recalled Markiewicz. Is he still certain that he had the right to do that?

[Drzycimski] Did he have the right?

[Woyciechowski] Yes.

[Drzycimski] This is one of the loopholes of the law, and the president brought the issue up—he realized that the issue would come up sooner or later. He thought that this problem had to be resolved, so that future actions could be taken within a specified legal framework. It was a loophole; the president showed that; and now we are quietly waiting for the Constitutional Tribunal to make a decision. At any rate, generally the president believes that, whenever he has any doubts, he feels he must speak out. He has done so in many other cases, in many far more difficult cases. He has some doubts, his conscience compels him to present it all. Now, whether this will prove itself remains an open issue. He did signal the problem, he did bring it up at a moment when decisions were being made too hastily; he decided to recall the chairman because he believed that the issues needed to be examined quietly—all the more so because, according to the president, the decisions were in great conflict with the Law on Radio and Television, which clearly states that one broadcaster cannot achieve a dominating position; however, it seemed that there was such a dominating position, because if one broadcaster receives both the satellite... [pauses] The nationwide television and regional stations, then, well, there is not much left for others.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Minister, today and yesterday the issue of those three presidential deputy ministers started to be discussed again. Today's papers carry reports that most probably Mr. Siemiatkowski will very soon be appointed deputy minister of national defense. Can you confirm that? Is this...

[Drzycimski, interrupting] This is definitely an issue... [pauses] Generally, I want to recall, and I have already said that the president believes that if a minister is entrusted with the function of steering a ministry, then...

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Then the minister selects his cooperators himself.

[Drzycimski] Then the minister selects his cooperators himself. Such positions cannot be filled in line with the so-called political-party system. That is one point. Second, if the ministries need to be strengthened, it is decided by the minister, who makes his decisions after examining not their past membership, but their professional skills and expertise. The president will always defend decisions made independently by ministers, not made under political pressure.

[Woyciechowski] In other words, we should not expect any important decisions today or tomorrow on the issue?

[Drzycimski, interrupting] I do not have any information on that.

[Woyciechowski] Another piece of information from today's press: The candidate of the Democratic Left Alliance for the post of deputy minister of internal affairs is Mr. Zbigniew Sobotko, or Sobotka, and Minister Milczanowski has not yet discussed that with the Belvedere. Do you know anything about that...

[Drzycimski, interrupting] This falls under the same rule; I am speaking now about the rule, not about persons. If the ministers decide that these are persons who are professionally able to...

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Then the president will not object to that.

[Drzycimski] No, he will not. The president believes that it is an issue of decisions; however, he will keep stressing that the decisions are up to the ministers, who do not have to yield to political pressure.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Minister, let us now briefly discuss the strikes. The Solidarity strikes. Today at 0830 [0730 GMT] Solidarity will begin picketing in front of the Sejm. Tomorrow Solidarity will hold talks with Prime Minister Pawlak. How do you evaluate the strike situation?

[Drzycimski] Well, we partly discussed that while talking about the budget. People had a right to expect certain things. That is their way of expressing concern, which will grow deeper. Therefore, both the government and Solidarity must attempt to find some solution. People's expectations were increased and so they must ask the question. Now, here is another, very important remark. The trade union role is to exert pressure; however, they must also remember that there is a certain limit that cannot be exceeded. Many years ago the president said that trade unions, in this case Solidarity, are just like good bacteria on a living organism: They are parasites, quote unquote; however, they must remember that they cannot destroy the organism they live in. That is, trade unions must put pressure, fight, keep reminding, submit demands, and so on. Those are their inalienable rights; it is the most fundamental right, which must be implemented. However, trade unions must also remember

that there is a certain limit, which is called the condition of the state. That limit is hard to exceed. Therefore, it is important that union people and government representatives sit at the negotiation table jointly, so that a discussion can be conducted over what can be done and to what extent. It seems that the resolution of the problem is going in that direction. Nevertheless, I would like to stress very strongly that it has been caused by the election campaign, where something entirely different was promised and the people are entitled to make demands.

[Woyciechowski] Thank you very much for the interview.

[Drzycimski] Thank you.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Arrives on Visit

AU1503204494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] Talks between the military delegation led by Army General Vitaliy Radeskyy, Ukrainian minister of defense, and Gheorghe Tinca, Romanian minister of national defense, accompanied by other prominent figures of the Romanian Army leadership, took place today in Bucharest. The talks emphasized the mutual determination to consolidate ties between the armies of the two countries and focused on various ways and means to expand cooperation on many planes. The Ukrainian minister expressed the desire to extend the military contacts at various echelons in order to achieve a better mutual understanding, to consolidate the relations of good neighborliness, and to positively solve problems of mutual interest.

At the end of the visit paid to our country by the Ukrainian military delegation, a cooperation accord between the Ministry of National Defense of Romania and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will be signed—a communique received from the Army's press bureau reads.

Visits Constanta, Black Sea Coast

AU1603135994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Text] The military delegation headed by Army General Vitaliy Radeskyy, Ukrainian defense minister, arrived in Constanta this morning. The Ukrainian guests were received by the head of the Chief of Staff of the Romanian Navy, Vice Admiral Gheorghe Anghelescu. The Ukrainian delegation's schedule also included visits to the destroyer Marasesti, to the Mircea cel Batran Navy Academy, and to the Romanian sea coast, our correspondent Mircea Lamba reports.

The Ukrainian defense minister will be received later today by Romanian President Ion Iliescu and by Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu.

Radeskyy on 'Excellent' Ties

AU1703093494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Statement by Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy Radeskyy after meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Theodor Melescanu in Bucharest on 16 March; recorded, in Russian with passage-by-passage translation into Romanian]

[Text] As you know, Romania is our neighbor, a country with which we have an over 600-km common border. We have discussed a few theoretical problems and found several joint points of interest. I am referring to political, military, and mainly technical-military aspects, such as the training of cadres and methods of training cadres. We also discussed complex technical-military issues and ways to coordinate actions, carry out joint maneuvers, and ensure an exchange of experience.

Today I visited the educational institution of the Romanian Navy. There, we discussed issues regarding our bilateral relations and our views about issues that are of great interest to both sides.

We drafted a number of conventions regarding cooperation between us, between our countries, such as the accord on cooperation between the two military departments. We also broached issues regarding the concept of and our participation in the Partnership for Peace, which both we and Romania have signed, and we agreed that this is a first stage and then, we will have to participate in NATO, but for this new stage we will have to prepare new proposals. I am referring to military issues and the issues of our departments.

Thus, in general I am very pleased with this visit because 70 percent of the issues we broached have been solved during my stay here, after one and a half days, and we still have a few visits scheduled. Our relations are excellent. Yesterday we held talks with the minister of defense and today with the foreign minister. Yesterday we discussed economic issues of mutual interest with the prime minister [Nicolae Vacaroiu]. He will soon pay a visit to Ukraine. We also have a meeting scheduled with Romania's president. In the evening we will meet with the chief of staff [Dumitru Cioflina], with whom we will discuss strictly military issues.

Military Cooperation Treaty Signed

AU1703170794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] An agreement on military cooperation between Romania and Ukraine was signed today by Gheorghe Tinca, Romanian minister of national defense, and General Vitaliy Radeskyy, Ukrainian minister of national defense.

At a subsequent news conference, Tinca said that the treaty covers a large sphere of activities of cooperation in the military, scientific, and educational spheres. In his turn, General Vitaliy Radeskyy expressed the hope that good cooperation between the armies of the two countries can contribute to good cooperation in the political sphere, something which both Romania and Ukraine can put to their use in the future.

PDSR, PAC Conclude Round of Talks

AU1703193794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] The first round of exploratory talks between the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] concluded a short while ago at Elisabeta Palace.

We agreed that both political parties ought to contribute to the lessening of tension in Romanian political life, not

merely at the parliamentary but also at the local administration level. We also agreed to cooperate with respect to draft bill packages and programs, stated PDSR Deputy Chairman Liviu Maior at a short news conference that followed the meeting. The next round of talks is scheduled for 29 March.

PAC Deputy Chairman Nicolae Taran stated that, quote, we established what we could jointly do and how long it would take us to achieve those things. The PAC is a member of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and therefore it cannot decide in the name of the CDR, but merely pledge things that it can achieve on its own. However, our position expressed today actually outlined the position of the CDR, unquote, our correspondent Florin Brusten reports.

CDR's Negotiation Terms to PDSR Reviewed

AU1703201094 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 15 Mar 94 p 3

[Marina Roman article: "The CDR Believes That the Current Regime Is Continuing the One Installed in 1947—the PNTCD Has Decided To Suspend Negotiations With the PDSR"]

[Text] The dialogue with the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] will continue only if the complete formula of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] is accepted and only if the ruling party will officially invite it to the negotiating table.

"There is no reason for us to continue discussions with the PDSR," said Senator Ion Diaconescu. The PDSR was informed of this even during the meeting held with the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD]. Both the talks at Cotroceni and those conducted with the CDR parties were initiated by the other side, namely President Ion Iliescu and the PDSR. In the PNTCD's view the terms for continuing the dialogue are the participation of the entire CDR and only following an invitation coming from the PDSR, as it did so far. "The Convention will then decide whether it will participate and if the invitation is not sent, then no harm is done either way," Mr. Diaconescu also said. It seems that the PDSR executive president is concerned about the unity of the Convention, "he cares for it." The common desire and struggle to replace the current regime that has been in power in Romania since the 1989 revolution constitutes the commitment of the CDR, Mr. Diaconescu reiterated. The current regime is considered to be the continuer of the communist regime. All the parties within the CDR are united in this struggle and when the goal has been achieved, each one is to follow its own ideology and program. "If Mr. Nastase wants to say that the executive power is united—at a time when we believed that the PDSR distanced itself from the viewpoints of Messrs. Funar, Vadim Tudor, or Paunescu—the opposition will treat this bloc as such," the Peasant Party leader concluded.

PD's Roman Views 'National Pact' Prospects

AU1803073094 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 14 Mar 94 pp 2, 3

[Speech by Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front), PD(FSN), at the meeting of the PD(FSN) Steering Collegium in Bucharest on 12 March: "In Times of Distress Democracy Is Impossible Without a Solid National Consensus"]

[Text] I would like to remind you that last November, after a number of speeches I had made on the same subject, I stressed the idea of a national pact, which meant the opening of talks and a dialogue with the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and the continuation of the dialogue with the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]. I initiated this action, proceeding from the realization that the reform was blocked and, what is more, the whole Romanian economy was in a state of blockage, something that is still being felt today by both our economic units and the population as a whole. This is something I was able to ascertain wherever I went during my visits through the country. From my discussions in various enterprises, I realized the meaning of this economic blockage, particularly for the citizens in the street, who are desperate since they can no longer cope with their daily needs. The danger of this situation must be obvious to everyone. We are witnessing some of the most aggressive manifestations of demagoguery—an almost incredible thing four years after the revolution—from the extremist and nationalist left-wing forces, which have begun to eulogize the communist regime, especially the Ceausescu regime, with a kind of shamelessness, which I no longer thought possible in our days. Their demagoguery relies on a very simple statement: "We gave the people work."

It does not really matter how we have reached such a situation and whether it has anything in common with the 1989 revolution. The fact is that we are faced here with a most dangerous kind of demagoguery. On the one hand, there is the danger of public opinion moving toward their choice, which would be a disaster for Romanian society, and, on the other hand, there is the inherent need to think out what we can do to maintain the idea and process of reform in our country and to move closer to the developed and civilized world. Moreover, as I have said on other occasions, too, it is known that in times of distress and hardship—as the period of transition is—democracy is impossible without a solid national consensus. You will find this statement in any manual of democracy, you will find this statement in any serious political analysis of the embarrassing moments that each democracy has had to go through. This supplements perfectly what I have just said about the danger of sliding off the course toward progress and modernization. We must fill up the huge void inherited from the former regime as far as the modernization of the economy and the ability to be competitive in economic, technological, and scientific matters are concerned. I raised this matter for the first time last August. It was

concretely embodied in the national pact formula, while the national pact was, in its turn, concretely presented in the letter you are all familiar with, namely the open letter sent to Romania's president, which specified the content of this pact in three spheres: political, economic, and social. This was the basis of our strategy, which, on the one hand, meant to convince the CDR of the usefulness of this idea—an endeavor that crowned with success, as can be seen from the statement signed by all opposition parties on 14 January 1994—after which we launched this initiative toward the PDSR. The PDSR was obliged—part of that party probably wanted to do it anyway—to engage in negotiations with the two components of the parliamentary opposition. Therefore, our proposal was for tripartite PDSR-CDR-PD(FSN) talks.

Of course, the ugly and unqualifiable maneuvers of the current parliamentary majority, made up of the so-called pentagon, have never ceased to manifest themselves in this period. Despite these maneuvers and the fact that the PD(FSN) has concretely been the target of these attack, we started these talks. Our delegation had two rounds of meetings with the PDSR. As far as the CDR is concerned, things were clarified with them through the signing of the 14 January convention.

The fact is that the latest governmental reshuffle took place at a time when we were in the process of discussing ways and means to come to an agreement on certain matters. I honestly tell you that, even now, I still cannot rationally find any explanation for this reshuffle. If I go beyond the boundaries of the rational and enter the backstage corridors of the political game, then I might find an explanation. However, there is no need to speculate at a time when we want to keep the door of the dialogue open, since we are categorically opposed to the principle "the worse it is now, the better will be for us later."

This reshuffle does not ring true. It raises several question marks. First of all, the act as such is outside the spirit of the Constitution. We cannot imagine that there can be two categories of ministers: those who are approved by Parliament, and those who are not. Likewise, it is at least an inelegant gesture, as far as the chosen moment is concerned, that is exactly at the time of the start of the inter-party negotiations and without any kind of consultations. We are referring here to the replacement of General Spiroiu, thus giving satisfaction to some very well-known calls.

Spiroiu has been engaged in a very active dialogue with NATO. The first thing I am asked in my capacity as NATO rapporteur is: What is your opinion on this or that? Well, in this respect, I can either say that I have no opinion or that it is a serious thing. By that, I can endanger our effort to draw closer to this organization. Therefore, some level of concern with promoting our national interests should have been shown. There should have been a minimum effort to explain the reasons for the reshuffle and its meaning, the wrong things done by the replaced people, and the qualifications brought by the new ministers for making the governmental act more efficiently. The absence of all this proves that the state of blockage has turned into a true state of chaos. We have thus reached a situation whereby the administration acts contrary to the country's laws, by abusively imposing the government's arbitrary will, without it actually solving anything, other than further complicating the process of reform. This blockage is extremely dangerous for the overall situation in which we find ourselves.

PD's Severin Views Talks With PDSR

AU1803095494 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 14 Mar 94 pp 2, 3

[Speech by Adrian Severin, vice president of the Democratic Party(National Salvation Front), PD(FSN), at the meeting of the PD(FSN) Steering Collegium, in Bucharest on 12 March: "In Times of Distress Democracy Is Impossible Without a Solid National Consensus"]

[Excerpts] I will try to talk about what we think is the current main political event, namely the negotiations between the Democratic Party(National Salvation Front) [PD(FSN)] and the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]. [passage omitted] We have to try to maintain a dialogue, but not for the sake of being somewhat closer to the spheres of power; with great responsibility, we are simply considering the current situation of our country and of our people. There are social segments that are facing such difficulties that they are no longer interested in political issues. We cannot come out of this impasse unless all responsible political forces unite. Only in this way will we be able to relaunch the economy and the reform process. [passage omitted]

In connection with the recent government reshuffle, I would like to specify that two PDSR figures, Mr. Ioan Solcanu and Oliviu Gherman, affirmed that this reshuffle had taken place by consulting the opposition. There was no such thing; these affirmations were made only to fool people. [passage omitted] This goes to show how confusing, if not immoral, the involvement in the dialogue by the majority formation is, and it also shows how difficult it is for us to discuss things under such conditions. Despite all this, we will continue along the same road. [passage omitted]

First I want to clarify whether the negotiations begun by our party with the PDSR representatives mean a change in our policy. The answer is no. [passage omitted] These negotiations are nothing but a resumption, under more dramatic circumstances, of the negotiations that we conducted in November 1992 before the formation of the Vacaroiu government. [passage omitted] From this point of view, there is no change in our policy. It is, however, the dramatic situation in our country that has caused these negotiations to resume. With what thoughts each side comes to these negotiations remains to be seen. We can talk only about ourselves. Within this context, I want to say that when we started negotiations with the PDSR we affirmed three things: "We have not come to

judge you, we have not come to be judged—because nothing gives you the right to be our judges—and we have not come to change your views or to change our views—because we are not your teachers just as you cannot be our teachers. [passage omitted] What we want to do is to see what measures we can find to seek joint objectives and the means of cooperation to implement them. [passage omitted]

Second, what are our objectives? [passage omitted] Or rather, what are not our objectives? It is not our objective to form an alliance with the PDSR. Such an alliance is ruled out. We are trying to achieve an alliance with genuinely social-democratic parties. [passage omitted] I am not talking of a political alliance. [passage omitted] It is our objective—and we have affirmed this from the very beginning in these discussions—to restructure the parliamentary majority. [passage omitted]

Third, what alternatives do we have at our disposal? The first one would be that this new majority generate a new government made up of the three reunited groups, the second alternative would be a government made up of the PDSR and the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] supported in parliament by the PD(FSN) proving that we do not want to be an obstacle in the formation of a better government than the current one and that we do not want to lay our hands, at all costs, on any of the portfolios. All we desire is to replace a government that is dangerous for the country. And the third alternative is a PDSR monochrome minority government supported in parliament by the current opposition. This third alternative—which was rapidly taken up by the PDSR—led to a number of discussions, controversies, and confusion in public opinion. [passage omitted] When we said that the third alternative would be to support a PDSR minority government, we did not say that this government was the Vacaroiu government—against which we have launched four motions. [passage omitted] It goes without saying that we do not support this government. Not because of a narrow-minded position, but because in two years of governing it has demonstrated that this government neither knows, wants, nor is able to do anything for the benefit of this country. When I said that we will support a PDSR government, I said that we will support any government other than the Vacaroiu government, and that we will not support the government without conditions. In order to support such a government, we have to agree on three aspects. First, on a reformist government program; second, on isolating extremist, intolerant, chauvinist, and anti-Semitic forces preventing such forces from being in power, and third, to guarantee that commitments will be respected and that the democratic process in Romania will continue. [passage omitted]

Fourth, this is a question I was asked in connection with the formula that was launched, which was not the most fortunate: Namely a nonaggression Pact. [passage omitted] This is what we proposed. [passage omitted] From our point of view, it is much easier for us to respect such an accord because our attitude already abides by it and because we do not put pressure on local administration nor on the other party's members, and so forth. It is clear that the PDSR has to assume serious responsibility in this respect. This is what we discussed.

Another question was raised in connection with possible negotiations with a view to obtaining certain advantages regarding the famous penal files, which have been opened or are to be opened by the control corps of the prime minister led and guided by the Romania Mare Party. Here, before you, I want to fully deny the following hypothesis: We have by no means started from the idea that, by conducting such discussions, we will be able to close some files. On the contrary. In our proposal regarding the way of action, we asked the ruling party to take steps so that the procedures of pursuit and investigation will be completed, no matter the results. We should not bargain on such things and I personally, as our party's vice president and leader of this delegation, will not let myself be blackmailed into such negotiations. It will not be possible to put pressure on us by manipulating these files, although we know—and you should know, too—that for a few days now, further pressure has been put on the Prosecutor's to reactivate the operations on the respective files; thus, additional arguments will probably be brought to the negotiating table.

The last question is linked to reactions and prospects. There are several kinds of reactions to these negotiations: On the one hand there were reactions in support. Unfortunately, to all our arguments there were signs of interest only when it came to party interests and not national ones. [passage omitted] There were also negative reactions. I had the opportunity to read an article in a local newspaper in Prahova County, which was unsigned, but betrayed the "vigorous" verbs of Mr. N. Ilie Nica, and which accused the Democratic Party. It is clear-cut that Mr. N. Ilie Nica does not want the negotiations to succeed. We also have information that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has instructed our ambassadors, particularly in countries with powerful social-democratic parties, to make it known there that the PD(FSN) has ceased to exist, that there is dissension in its leadership, that Petre Roman and other leaders will soon be replaced, and other such things. We have absolutely factual information in this respect. It is a recent action. I am sure that those who have desired that this government reshuffle take place the way it did also include people who believe that such methods will stop the negotiations or make us much more rigid.

As you see, there have been a whole number of reactions to these negotiations. Everybody favors reform, democracy, and national consensus; in actual fact, however, it seems that the moment opportunities emerge for all this to be built, there are certain people who create obstacles for such a process.

I want to conclude with a sentence I heard recently at the Council of Europe uttered by Thorvald Stoltenberg, one of the two negotiators on former Yugoslavia. Asked whether he was optimistic about the results of the

negotiations, he said he was, but when asked what reasons there were to be optimistic, he said there were none. I will tell you the same thing. We do not have special reasons to be optimistic. Despite this, we will remain optimistic, no matter what obstacles may arise; we will prove that we stay optimistic to the very end, even risking being considered naive; we will prove our goodwill even if we risk being called foolish. We will do all we can, to the very end, so that no one can say that we have not made all possible efforts to achieve a positive result, and so that we cannot be blamed should these negotiations fail.

Coposu Favors New Parliamentary Majority

AU1803072694 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 14 Mar 94 p 3

[Interview with Corneliu Coposu, president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, by Roxana Badralexi; place and date not given: "It Is Not Up to the Social Democracy Party of Romania To Make Concessions and Mr. Iliescu Is Not Ready To Make Concessions"]

[Text] [Badralexi] Mr. Coposu, have you noted any compatibility between your party and the ruling party?

[Coposu] It is obvious that, regardless of the incompatibility and doctrine differences between various political groupings, there are also prospects of compatibility. Normally, each political grouping should give priority to the struggle for a program that can please the citizens they are representing. Consequently, this is a likely common target. Of course, one can also add that there are very many demagogic political groupings. However, one should generally proceed from the viewpoint—incontestable, in principle—that all parties want the good of the people.

[Badralexi] What about the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]?

[Coposu] This is a party without a program. It is being kept together by the temporary interests of its members. If these interests disappear, the party will disappear, too. However, even without this lack of a program, one cannot say that all its components are totally devoid of good intentions for the country. In my opinion, there are two trends within the PDSR. One—which for the time being is in a majority—is the radical trend, consisting of people with a crypto-communist mentality, who have not yet rid themselves of the Stalinist methods.

[Badralexi] Can you give some names?

[Coposu] I do not want to get that specific. There is a known group which has emerged along these lines and which does not make any bones about its orientation. Another group, more modest in numbers, which is unfortunately subject to the moral pressure of the radicals, has a more moderate tinge. Of course, there are valuable people among the moderates. Do not ask me to name them, because I will not become personal in this respect, either.

[Badralexi] At least tell me what you think about Messrs. Nastase [PDSR executive president] and [Pdsr President] Gherman: Are they moderate or radical?

[Coposu] Both are moderates, in my opinion. However, as I have already said, this group is unfortunately under the moral pressure of the others. Our older hopes about the increase of the moderate group's share have not come true. Therefore, if the situation is not worse than a few months ago, it is at least the same now as then. However, to answer your question, I will just refer to the moderate group. There would be some compatibility between that PDSR group and our party—not necessarily programmatic, but a compatibility regarding the short-term common targets for this period and a pragmatic approach to working out a crisis program.

[Badralexi] Is it possible that the PDSR might see no other way out at this point than to leave the initiative up to the moderate group? If so, do you think it possible that the PNTCD would back a monocolor PDSR government?

[Coposu] In my opinion, it is not up to the PDSR or one of its two aforementioned groups to make concessions. This is the prerogative of President Ion Iliescu, who has a monopoly over the political power in Romania. But Mr. Iliescu is not ready to make any kind of concessions; he wants to keep all levers of power.

[Badralexi] What might prevent him from realizing that he has no other choice?

[Coposu] Maybe an unjustified fear of the consequences of a change in his absolute power.

[Badralexi] Consequences that might affect him personally, or are you talking about political consequences?

[Coposu] I think he is worried about his person. All the assurances we gave him were disregarded by him, as they are difficult to be believed by a man who thinks with another kind of logic than ours. Of course, Mr. Iliescu has not yet realized that our party and the opposition in general has other goals than witch hunting. Proof of our mentality is the fact that in the past four year no serious member of the PNTCD or the Association of Former Political Detainees [AFDP] has expressed any desire to take revenge against the inquisitors.

[Badralexi] Will the president manage to suppress this fear for his own security?

[Coposu] Unfortunately, I am pessimistic in this respect. My impression, which I do not want confirmed, is that the president is not ready to give up his monopoly of power, unless he is faced with the threat of popular wrath. This is something that should be avoided, since it might have a destabilizing effect and might delay the normalization of the situation in Romania. Therefore, as

far as I am concerned, after following a logical line of thinking which I believe he has also followed, I have come to the conclusion that he is reticent about the usefulness of concessions that can lead to the pacification of Romanian society and to reconciliation.

[Badralexi] Let us talk now about the president's government. Would a possible change of premiers also change your position on backing a monocolor government?

[Coposu] No, because it is not Mr. Vacaroiu's presence that prevents a change of attitude. Right now, there are only two solutions: a change of the parliamentary majority or early elections. The governmental reshuffle should be done in such a way as to gain internal and external credibility. This cannot be achieved through a simple rotation of persons and an abusive interpretation of the constitution, by avoiding to submit the new cabinet members to the Parliament's vote. As long as a parliamentary majority that supports a credible and competent government cannot be put together, there is only the alternative of early elections. However, nobody wants them, since that would mean further social destabilization that could drag on for half a year, let alone the inherent expenses and the stagnation of reform that a ballot would imply. However, I would like to be proven wrong and a new parliamentary majority can be formed, a majority which will support a stable and more credible government than the one which has brought the country to the threshold of disaster.

[Badralexi] Would a PDSR government with an authentic reforming program, which enjoys the support of the parliamentary opposition, imply a change of the parliamentary majority?

[Coposu] Provided that this government is supported by that part of the PDSR which we have called moderate. But this is not the important thing. The important thing is to work out a crisis program supported by all responsible forces, at least for a certain period of time.

[Badralexi] How do you concretely see such a parliamentary change?

[Coposu] There are several aspects here. There is the possibility of a minority government which has abandoned its alliance with the extremist parties and is supported in all its democratic initiatives by the current opposition. What I have in mind is a government set up by the moderate wing of the PDSR and the representatives of the opposition, that is the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and the Democratic Party [PD(FSN)]. Together, these forces could put together a comfortable majority. There is also the possibility of an opposition government supported by the PDSR moderate wing.

[Badralexi] Would that be enough?

[Coposu] Yes, provided that it gets the support of a part of the PDSR. This hypothesis cannot be excluded. However, in order to achieve this, there must be a political will for change—something which unfortunately does not yet exist. For the time being, the only valid hypothesis remains that of a minority government. As far as the support of the opposition is concerned, this could be granted not only to back the implementation of the IMF memorandum, which is non-negotiable, but also to promote a number of indispensable laws which have been deliberately postponed until now. Without these laws, one cannot even dream of a process of normalization or a beginning of democratization. One must prove in actual fact the desire to carry out the reform. The first stage of any negotiations should be the working out of a program. The other aspects are secondary and giving priority to them is proof of a lack of seriousness.

[Badralexi] If we believe that President Iliescu reaches the conclusion that he has no other choice than to make concessions and part with his pathological fear, what would be the maximum concessions that the PNTCD is ready to make for a possible cooperation with the rulers?

[Coposu] Our party's principles are nonnegotiable. I believe that one should not ask from us to make any greater concessions than our declared readiness to support all the democratic measures designed to take the country out of the crisis. Therefore, instead of isolating ourselves and watching the catastrophe unfold, we have expressed our readiness to partake effectively in solving the crisis. However, I do not consider it as a concession, since this is the moral obligation of all responsible political factors in Romania.

[Badralexi] Mr. Coposu, before we wind up this interview, I would like you to tell me whether a Romanian politician today can say what Iuliu Maniu [leader of the National Peasant Party between the two world wars] said at one time: "I have ruled the country for 20 years from the opposition."

[Coposu] Well, Maniu did not lie...

[Badralexi] We know that, but would such a thing be possible today?

[Coposu] This would be possible—if not today, then tomorrow. After all, the role of the opposition in a democracy is equally as important as the role of the government. The checking done to the government's administration by a strong opposition is equally as important as the governing act itself. Maniu was right, the country can also be governed from the opposition. On the other hand, the absence of an opposition leads to either totalitarianism or catastrophe. Particularly if the political power gets into the hands of incompetent people devoid of patriotism, whose only preoccupation is to ensure the endless prolongation of their power of decision, which they have acquired at a certain point.

'Text' of Federation, Confederation Accord

AU1703164494 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 11-18 Mar 94 pp 4-5

["Text" of the "Framework Agreement for the Federation and the Principles and Foundations of the Confederation" agreed on "in Washington 1 March 1994"]

[Text]

Framework Agreement for the Federation

The undersigned have agreed on the attached Framework Agreement establishing a Federation in the areas of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a majority Bosniak and Croat population and on the attached Outline of a Preliminary Agreement for a Confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation.

They have further agreed to establish a high-level Transitional Committee, which will take immediate and concrete steps toward the establishment of the Federation and Confederation. The Committee will begin its work on 4 March 1994 in Vienna and will seek to conclude by 15 March 1994:

(1) The Constitution of the Federation;

(2) The Preliminary Agreement of the Confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the proposed Federation;

(3) An agreement regarding military arrangements in the territory of the proposed Federation;

(4) Transitional measures to expedite the establishment of the Confederation and Federation, including where possible the creation or governmental structures as outlined in the Framework Agreement; and any other measures determined to be necessary. (Signatures of Haris Silajdzic, Mate Granic, Kresimir Zubak)

I. Establishment

Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, the Statement of Principles by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia at its session in London, as well as the decisions of the United Nations Security Council relating to the former Yugoslavia; and

Based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the peoples and citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, determined to ensure full national equality, democratic relations, and the highest standards of human rights and freedoms, hereby create a Federation.

Bosniaks and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with others) and citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniak and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a Federation that is composed of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities.

The decisions on the constitutional status of the territories of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a majority of Serb population shall be made in the course of negotiations toward a peaceful settlement and at the international Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

II. Division of Responsibilities

1. The central government to have exclusive responsibility for:

—Foreign affairs.
—National defense: including joint command; joint military arrangements within the Confederation; and protection of national borders.
—Citizenship.
—Economic policy, including planning and reconstruction.
—Commerce, including customs, international trade and finance; trade within the Federal Republic; communications.
—Finance: national currency; monetary and fiscal policy; regulation of financial institutions; joint arrangements within the Confederation.
—Combating international crimes, inter-cantonal crimes, and others of special interest to the central government (e.g., terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime); and cooperating with Interpol.
—Financing of the central government (taxation, borrowing).
—Radio-television frequency allocation.
—Energy policy and infrastructure, including inter-cantonal distribution/allocation matters.

2. The central government and the cantons to have responsibility for:

—Human rights.
—Health.
—Environmental policy.
—Infrastructure for communications and transport.
—Social welfare policy.
—Immigration and asylum.
—Tourism.
—Use of natural resources.

As appropriate, these responsibilities may be exercised jointly or separately, or by the cantons as coordinated by the central government.

3. The cantons shall have all responsibility not expressly granted to the central government. They shall have, in particular, authority over the following:

—Police (identical Federation uniforms, with cantonal insignia).
—Education.
—Culture.

—Housing.
—Local land use (zoning).
—Financing of cantonal governments (taxation. borrowing).
—Local business and charitable activities (regulation, facilitation).
—Energy production (organization of local production facilities).
—Radio and television.
—Social welfare services (provision).
—Tourist development.

III. STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

A. Executive Authority

1. The president and vice president:

a. The Legislature shall elect one Bosniak and one Croat, who shall serve alternate one-year terms as president and vice president during a four-year period.

b. The president shall be the head of state.

2. The government:

a. The government shall consist of a prime minister; a deputy prime minister; and ministers, each of whom shall have a deputy. No deputy (including the deputy prime minister) may be from the same constituent people as his minister.

b. The president, with the concurrence at the vice-president, shall nominate the government, which shall be elected by the House of Representatives.

No fewer than one-third of the ministerial positions shall be occupied by Croats.

c. The prime minister shall be the head of government.

3. The respective competences of the president and of the prime minister and the government shall be specified in the Constitution.

4. Decisions of the government that concern the vital interest of any of the constituent peoples shall require consensus.

B. The Legislature

1. The legislature shall consist of two houses:

a. The House of Representatives (lower house), which shall be elected democratically on a proportional basis in the Federation as a whole;

b. The House of Peoples, which shall have an equal number of Bosniak and Croat delegates. Each canton shall be allocated a number of seats to be occupied by Bosniak delegates and a number of seats to be occupied be Croat delegates, in proportion to these two groups in the legislature of that canton; the Bosniak and Croat delegates from each canton are to be elected, respectively by the Bosniak and Croat representatives in its legislature.

2. Decisions of the legislature require the approval of both houses.

a. Decisions that concern the vital interest of any of the constituent peoples shall require, in the House of Peoples, the approval of a majority of the Bosniak representatives and of a majority of the Croat representatives.

b. Amendments of the Constitution shall require in the House of Peoples the vote specified in (a) above and, in the House of Representatives (lower house), a two-thirds majority.

c. Other decisions shall be taken by simple majority in each house.

C. The Judiciary

1. There shall be a Constitutional Court competent to resolve disputes among the cantons, between any of these and the Federation, between any municipality and its canton or the Federation, or between or within any of the organs of the Federation. The judges shall be nominated by the president and elected by the legislature, and shall consist of an equal number from each of the constituent peoples; during a transitional period of five years, one-third of the judges shall be appointed by the president of the International Court of Justice from persons who are not citizens of the Federation.

2. There shall be a Human Rights Court established in accordance with Resolution 93 (6) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, whose composition and competence shall be specified in the Constitution.

3. There shall be a Supreme Court, which shall have selective appellate jurisdiction from the courts of the cantons and such jurisdiction as specified in the Constitution and in legislation. The members of the Court shall be nominated by the president and elected by the legislature, and shall consist of an equal number of judges from each of the constituent peoples.

II. The Cantonal Governments

Each canton shall take all necessary steps to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms provided in the instruments listed in the Annex and shall act consistently with the Constitution of the Federation.

Each canton shall exercise its responsibilities with due regard to the population in each municipality. It may delegate appropriate powers to municipality and should do so when the municipality's majority population is a minority in the canton as a whole.

A. Executive Authority

1. President: The cantonal president shall as elected by a uniform procedure to be specified in the Federation Constitution and reflected in the constitutions of the cantons.

2. Government: The cantonal government shall be nominated by the cantonal president and approved by the cantonal legislature. Each cantonal government shall have a composition reflecting that of the population of the canton.

3. In exercising its responsibilities in respect to the cantonal police, the cantonal government shall ensure that the composition of the police shall reflect that of the population of the canton, provided that the composition of the police of each municipality shall reflect the composition of the latter.

B. The Legislature

Each canton shall have a legislature, which shall be elected democratically on a proportional basis in the canton as a whole.

C. The Judiciary

Each canton shall have courts, which shall be competent to hear appeals from the Courts of the municipalities, and have independent jurisdiction over cases not within the competence of those courts. The judges shall be nominated by the cantonal president, and elected by the cantonal parliament, in such a way that the composition of the judiciary as a whole shall reflect that of the population of the canton.

III. The Municipality Governments

1. Municipalities shall exercise self-rule on local matters.

2. The Municipality Executive: Each municipality shall have an executive elected by its governing council.

3. Each municipality shall have a governing council elected democratically on a proportional basis.

4. Each municipality shall establish courts, the jurisdiction of which shall be specified by cantonal legislation.

IV. Councils of Cantons

Cantons with a Bosniak-majority or a Croat-majority population may establish councils of cantons in order to coordinate policies and activities on matters at common interest to their communities and to advise their representatives in the House of Peoples.

V. Human Rights

3. [numbering as published] All persons shall have the right to have restored to them any property of which they were deprived in the course of ethnic cleansing and to be compensated for any property which cannot be restored to them. All statements or commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to the relinquishment of rights to land or property shall be treated as null and void.

4. All courts, administrative agencies and other governmental organs of the Federation shall apply and conform to the rights and freedoms provided in the instruments listed in the Annex. A Court of Human Rights shall be established; its composition and competence shall be set out in the Constitution.

5. The Federation shall cooperate with any international human rights monitoring mechanisms established for Bosnia-Herzegovina and with the supervisory bodies established by any of the instruments listed in the Annex.

6. To assist in implementing the rights and freedoms specified in the Constitution, an ombudsman shall be appointed by the CSCE from each recognized group: Bosniaks, Croats, and others. Each ombudsman shall have offices throughout the Federation as he deems appropriate and shall have the responsibility to investigate fully matters regarding security, rights, and freedoms and to report to competent government agencies, including the prime minister of the Federation, and to the CSCE.

VI. Military Arrangements

Both sides agree to the establishment of a unified military command of the military of the Federation.

The sides will develop comprehensive transitional arrangements to that end in the context of a military agreement. In the transitional period:

—current command structures will remain in place;
—forces of the sides will disengage from one another immediately, with the aim of withdrawing a safe distance to be specified in the military agreement; and
—all foreign armed forces, except those present with the agreement of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the authorization of the UN Security Council, will leave the territory of the Federation.

VII. Approval of the Constitution

The Constitution of the Federation will be promulgated by a constituent assembly that shall consist of those representatives elected at the 1990 elections to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina whose mandate is still valid. Approval of the Constitution shall require consensus between the delegation of the Croat people, comprising all representatives of Croat nationality, and the delegation of the Bosniak people, comprising all representatives of Bosniak nationality.

VIII. Arrangement During the Transitional Period

The two parties agree to establish a high level committee that will prepare a draft constitution of the Federation and coordinate other matters related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement. The committee will start its work in Vienna on 4 March 1994.

Until the Constitution of the Federation enters into force, the present administrative arrangements will continue in effect everywhere in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, unless the committee decides otherwise by consensus and except in the Mostar City Municipality, which the two sides agree will be governed by an European Union administrator for up to two years.

ANNEX

Human Rights Instruments Incorporated Into the Constitutional Agreement

A. General Human Rights, especially Civil and Political Rights

1. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

2. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

3. The 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV on the Laws of War, and the 1977 Geneva Protocols I-II thereto

4. The 1950 European Convention for the Protection Of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and Protocols 1-10 thereto

5. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the protocol thereto

6. The 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

7. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 1966 and 1989 Optional Protocols thereto

8. The 1979 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

9. The 1981 (UN) Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief

10. The 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

11. The 1987 European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

12. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child

B. Protection of Groups and Minorities

13. The 1990 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation on the Rights of Minorities, paragraphs 10-13

14. The 1992 (UN) Declaration On the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities

C. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

15. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 22-27

16. The 1961 European Social Charter and the Protocol 1 thereto

17. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

D. Citizenship and Nationality

18. The 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women

19. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.

The Principles and Foundations for a Confederation

It is anticipated that a Confederation will be established by the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter "Croatia") and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereinafter the "Federation").

The steps toward establishing the Confederation shall be:

(1) A preliminary agreement, to be concluded as soon as possible; and

(2) A final agreement, to be concluded between Croatia and the Federation as soon as the latter is established.

I

The establishment of the Confederation shall not change the international identity or legal personality of Croatia or of the Federation.

II

The Confederation shall, through the enactment of regulations and otherwise:

(1) Establish a common market providing for the free movement of goods, services, and capital; and

(2) Facilitate cooperation and the development of common policies in the following areas:

(i) transport;

(ii) energy;

(iii) the environment;

(iv) economic policy, including laws and regulations governing the development of free markets, finance, and customs;

(v) the reconstruction of the economy;

(vi) health care;

(vii) culture, science, and education;

(viii) product standardization and consumer protection;

(ix) migration, immigration, and asylum;

(x) law enforcement, particularly with regard to terrorism, smuggling, drug abuse, and organized crime.

III

Croatia and the Federation shall as soon a possible enact internal regulations and conclude agreements under the auspices of the Confederation necessary to establish:

(1) A customs union

(2) A monetary union; and

(3) Defense arrangements, including the coordination of defense policies and the establishment of joint command staffs in the event of war or imminent peril to either party.

IV

The Parties shall conclude as soon as possible agreements granting the Federation unrestricted access to the Adriatic Sea through Croatia and granting Croatia unrestricted transit through Neum, as specified in the attached Annex.

V

In order to coordinate their policies and activities as provided in this Agreement, the parties shall constitute a Confederative Council, in which each party shall have an equal number of members. Conclusions of the Council shall require the approval of a majority of the members from each party.

The president of the Confederative Council shall be elected by the Council for a term of one year, alternately from among the members of each party.

Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation Granting the Federation Access to the Adriatic Through the Territory of the Republic of Croatia

The Republic of Croatia and the Federation

Considering that it is desirable that the Federation (hereinafter the "Federation") have assured and unrestricted access to the Adriatic Sea on the surface and in the air through and over the territory of the Republic of Croatia hereinafter "Croatia"),

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS

Article 1

(a) Croatia shall lease to the Federation for the duration of this Agreement the plot of land within the Port of Ploce, including the docks and the parts of the harbor pertaining thereto described in the Annex hereto (hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Area").

(b) Croatia agrees that the Leased Area shall enjoy the status of a free zone, in which no duties or taxes imposed by Croatia shall apply.

Article 2

(a) Croatia shall allow access to and from the Leased Area:

(i) By ships from the Adriatic Sea, through the territorial waters of Croatia, subject to such ships complying with any applicable international regulations;

(ii) By ships or barges up the Neretva River up to the point where that river enters the territory of the Federation;

(iii) By railroad on the line between Ploce to Sarajevo up to the point where that railroad line enters the territory of the Federation;

(iv) By road between Ploce to Sarajevo up to the point where that road enters the territory of the Federation.

(b) Ships, barges, railroad cars, and trucks and other road vehicles using the routes referred to in paragraph (a) that are marked by an emblem of the Federation shall not be entered or inspected by any public authority of Croatia.

(c) Limits on the sizes and specifications of the characteristics of the ships, barges, railroad cars, and trucks and other road vehicles referred to in paragraph (b) and of the volume of traffic on the routes referred to in paragraph (a) may be set by the Joint Commission established in accordance with Article 4.

(d) Should the limits set in accordance with paragraph (c) restrict the volume of traffic that the Federation considers it necessary to maintain, then it may, at its cost and in accordance with plans approved by the Joint Commission, arrange for the capacity of the routes referred to in paragraph (a) to be increased.

(e) With respect to any traffic of persons or goods carried out pursuant to this Article, all responsibilities for compliance with international laws and obligations shall be assumed by the Federation.

Article 3

Croatia grants to the Federation the right to authorize any types of aircraft to overfly the territory of Croatia, including its territorial waters, subject to such aircraft complying with any applicable international air traffic regulations.

Article 4

(a) The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission to assist in implementing the present Agreement by:

(i) establishing any rules and standards required for implementing the Agreement, and in particular Article 2 (c) including for any construction;

(ii) arrange for any monitoring required to prevent abuses of the Agreement;

(iii) settle, subject to Article 6, any disputes regarding the interpretation or the application of the Agreement.

(b) Croatia and the Federation shall appoint three members each to the Joint Commission and they shall by joint agreement appoint three more members, one of whom shall be the chairman. If no agreement can be reached on one or more of the joint appointments within three months, the secretary-general of the United Nations shall make those appointments at the request of either party.

(c) The Joint Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Its decisions shall require five concurring votes.

Article 5

The present Agreement may be supplemented by others designed to implement the 1965 Convention on the Transit Trade of Land-Locked States.

Article 6

Unless otherwise agreed, any legal dispute concerning the interpretation of this Agreement may be submitted by either party for a binding decision to the arbitral tribunal to which both parties shall appoint one member each, with the chairman appointed jointly; should any of the required appointments not be made within three months, they may be made by the president of the International Court of Justice at the request of either party.

Article 7

This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of 99 years, except as otherwise agreed by the parties.

DONE in 1994, in three copies, each in English, Croatian, and Bosnian languages, which shall be equally authentic.

Agreement Between the Federation and the Republic of Croatia Granting Croatia Transit Through the Territory of the Federation

The Federation and the Republic of Croatia

Considering that it is desirable that the Republic of Croatia hereinafter "Croatia") have assured and unrestricted transit through the Municipality of Neum of the Federation,

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The Federation shall allow Croatia unrestricted transit by road through Neum between the eastern and western borders of Neum with Croatia.

Article 2

(a) Trucks and other road vehicles using the road referred to in Article 1 that are marked by the emblem of Croatia shall not be entered or inspected by any public authority of the Federation.

(b) Limits on the sizes and specifications of the trucks and other road vehicles referred to in paragraph (a) and of the volume of traffic on the road (referred to in Article 1) may be set by the Joint Commission established in accordance with Article 3.

(c) Should the limits set in accordance with paragraph (b) restrict the volume of traffic that Croatia considers it necessary to maintain, then it may, at its costs and in accordance with plans approved by the Joint Commission, arrange for the capacity of the road referred to in Article 1 to be increased.

(d) With respect to any traffic of persons or goods carried out pursuant to Article 1 and 2, all responsibilities for compliance with international laws and obligations shall be assumed by Croatia.

Article 3

(a) The parties hereby establish a Joint Commission to assist in implementing the present Agreement by:

(i) establishing any rules and standards required for implementing the Agreement, and in particular Article 2(b), including for any construction;

(ii) arrange for any monitoring required to prevent abuses of the Agreement;

(iii) settle, subject to Article 4, any disputes regarding the interpretation or the application of the Agreement.

(b) The Federation and Croatia shall appoint three members each to the Joint Commission and they shall by joint agreement appoint three more members, one of whom shall be chairman. If no agreement can be reached on one or more of the joint appointments within three months, the secretary-general of the United Nations shall make those appointments at the request of either party.

(c) The Joint Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Its decisions shall require five concurring votes.

Article 4

Unless otherwise agreed, any legal dispute concerning the interpretation of this Agreement may be submitted by either party for a binding decision to as arbitral tribunal to which both parties shall appoint one member each, with the chairman appointed jointly; should any of the required appointments not be made within three months, they may be made by the president of the International Court of Justice at the request of either party.

Article 5

This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of 99 years, except as otherwise agreed by the parties.

The Agreement is done in 1994, in three copies, each in the English, Croatian and Bosnian languages, which shall be equally authentic.

The undersigned have agreed on the attached Framework Agreement establishing a Federation in the areas of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a majority Bosniak and Croat population and on the attached Outline of a Preliminary Agreement for a Confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation.

They have further agreed to establish a high-level Transitional Committee, which will take immediate and concrete steps toward the establishment of the Federation and Confederation. The Committee will begin its work on 4 March 1994 in Vienna and will seek to conclude by 15 March 1994:

(1) The Constitution of the Federation;

(2) The Preliminary Agreement of the Confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the proposed Federation;

(3) An agreement concerning military arrangements in the territory of the proposed Federation;

(4) Transitional measures to expedite the establishment of the Confederation and Federation, including where possible the creation or governmental structures as outlined in the Framework Agreement; and any other measures determined to be necessary.

[Signed] Haris Silajdzic, Mate Granic, Kresimir Zubak

Ganic, General Discuss Demilitarization

AU1703212494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] One day after taking over the post of UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] commander in former Yugoslavia, French General Bertrand Guillaume de Sauville de Lapresle visited Sarajevo where he discussed—as he said—the future with Presidency member Ejup Ganic and General Rasim Delic. He also discussed the issue of Sarajevo with Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic. Senada Cumurovic reports.

[Cumurovic] After talks with General de Lapresle, Ejup Ganic told journalists what was discussed at the one-hour meeting.

[Begin Ganic recording] We informed him that the agreement, the cease-fire, and the disengagement of our Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] forces is functioning in the best possible way, and that conditions are ripening for the Bosniaks and the Croats to return to their homes. The situation is returning to normal in that part of our state. (?At the same time) we pointed out the grave situation in Maglaj where the Serbian aggressor continues to pursue his military aims, and the grave situation in Bihac. Moreover, we pointed to certain events [words indistinct] of Serbian troops in the occupied territories. [end recording]

[Cumurovic] As far as the possible negotiations with the Serbian side are concerned, Dr. Ganic mentioned two conditions for these negotiations.

[Begin Ganic recording] We are ready to begin negotiations with the Serbian side immediately, providing that they speed up the withdrawal from territories where the Bosniaks were the majority population before the aggression and providing that the international community speeds up the proceedings against war criminals. [end recording]

[Cumurovic] The demilitarization of Sarajevo was also discussed with the UNPROFOR commander for former Yugoslavia.

[Begin Ganic recording] We informed the general that we agree to the demilitarization of Sarajevo, which is still under blockade, the roads are still blocked, providing that all citizens (?can return to their) homes. [Words indistinct] toward normalization, return of trust, and, of course, the further development of Sarajevo as an undivided city, a single city. [end recording]

[Cumurovic] General Bertrand Guillaume de Sauville de Lapresle, who yesterday morning took over command, came to visit Sarajevo today, because he believes—as he said in his statement—that there are many reasons that make it important for him to be here.

[Begin Lapresle recording in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I would say that I have come here so that I could put my professional abilities at the disposal [words indistinct] and help with establishing peace in this country which has suffered so much, and in which I and my troops wish to be of service by working in accordance with political negotiations and aims that would satisfy all the sides in the conflict. [end recording]

Commentary on Russian Influence, Federation

AU1803121494 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 11-18 Mar 94 p 9

[Commentary by Vlastimir Mijovic: "The Moscow Tailor's Shop"]

[Text] Last week Moscow welcomed Radovan Karadzic and his Pale delegation with open arms. Boris Yeltsin did refrain from shaking hands with the man who has been accused of committing war crimes unheard of in this century, but the fact remains that official Moscow honored Karadzic in many ways that are by no means fitting to his real significance and status. Karadzic was a Moscow prima donna for three days. He was received by top politicians, he met with cultural and political figures, and reporters were always tugging at his sleeve. The

Chetnik leader had reason enough to glow with pleasure. Namely, his dream about winning Russia's approval for his ideas and war aims had come true.

Although Russian officials have verbally tried to relativize and represent this sudden closeness with the Pale gang as objective mediation in the Bosnian negotiation process, even laymen understand that Russia is in effect taking up high patronage not only of the rebel Bosnian Serbs, but of the Orthodox part of the former Yugoslavia. The Kremlin has two objectives: To use the Bosnian crisis to bring their diplomacy back into international focus, and to reestablish the southern Slav part of Balkans as their interest sphere.

For the time being, at least as far as the first objective is concerned, Russia is doing more improvising than actually playing the role that it would like to play in the Bosnian crisis. Using a cheap trick in cooperation with its friends in Pale, Russia tried to win the points in the game with the NATO ultimatum that eventually led to the resolution of most of Sarajevo's war problems. The trick was repeated upon Karadzic's arrival in Moscow, when the Russian- Serb agreement on the reopening of Tuzla airport was flamboyantly declared. The Kremlin diplomats triumphantly ascribed the main role in the humanitarian unblocking of the Tuzla region to themselves, although they understand that the UN would have conducted the operation with or without the Russian-Serb approval. However, Russia has succeeded in something here, as in the Sarajevo case: It has reinforced its military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Using the logic of following the path of the least resistance, the UN has accepted Russian control role of the airport, as they accepted a similar role for Russian soldiers in Sarajevo. However, the question arises as to how far it is possible to go. The ultimate Russian intention is to, in agreement with Belgrade and Pale, deploy its soldiers in all the Bosnian buffer zones as peace arrives in them. This is the line Karadzic followed in talking to the presidents of both parliamentary councils of Russia, whose have the final word when it comes to sending Russian troops out of the country. There are many reasons to consider the possibility that, following the trends of Russian policies employed so far, Bosnia will soon be divided and militarily neutralized like post-war Germany, with internal borders seemingly there inevitably to divide the country, marked by Russian troops on one side and Western troops on the other.

Russia wants to work on this arrangement hand in hand with Washington. The United States has so far refused the Moscow initiatives for returning to the principle of division of interest spheres. However, no one can guarantee that this will not eventually happen. Chiefs of diplomacy, Kozyrev and Christopher, are meeting later this week in Vladivistok, and Bosnia will be the center of attention. The Kremlin has planned to close the circle started with Karadzic by then directly contacting Croatian and Muslim leaders.

Haris Silajdzic accepted Moscow's invitation, but did not want to rush off to Moscow, which wished to see him the same evening that Karadzic was leaving. It seems that the head of the Bosnian Government also refused the honors that he was offered, certainly aware of the false hospitality that the Russians were suddenly offering. By going to Moscow, he acknowledges Russia's importance in the resolving of the Bosnian crisis. Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic is doing the same. He will be visiting Russia's capital at the same time as Silajdzic.

For the time being, there are no indications that Russian diplomacy will mediate between the three people who have been negotiating on Bosnia for a long time and without much success, but it is quite possible that some of Karadzic's important messages will be conveyed to Silajdzic and Granic by Kozyrev and Churkin. The matter primarily concerns territorial demarcations within Bosnia- Herzegovina.

To conclude, let us say that Moscow is very interested in what lies behind the Muslim-Croat agreement signed in Washington, which it both wants and fears. It wants the agreement because it effectively legalizes its aim, which is to break independent Bosnia- Herzegovina definitely into pieces, and fears it because the unification of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats with the Republic of Croatia can easily lead to another escalation of the war, that is, to the creation of a Muslim-Croat anti-Serb block! Russia is prepared for either case. Everyone involved in deciding on Bosnia's future should be aware that in either case Mother Russia will undoubtedly be a Serb sponsor, and is, for the sake of its protege, prepared to risk as much as its own international prestige.

Krajisnik: 'Serbs Have the Right to Sarajevo'

LD1803115494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1102 GMT 18 Mar 94

[Text] Nis, 18 Mar (TANJUG)—"We will never agree to the Serb part of Sarajevo becoming part of a Muslim republic," Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the assembly of the Srpska republic, told Nis radio today.

"The Serbs simply have the right to Sarajevo and they will persist in this, while I hope that whoever wants peace has to understand this," Krajisnik said. "I know what the intentions of the other side are—that the city should be mixed and as such become a part of the Muslim republic," Krajisnik said, adding that Sarajevo as a divided city enables the normal functioning of the Serb and Muslim parts, makes life easier for the population, and eliminates causes for fighting.

Krajisnik said that these are all the conditions [as received] and that after yesterday's signing of an agreement opening up blue roads in the Sarajevo area for the civilian population and humanitarian needs, all those advocating war will remain in a minority.

In conclusion, he said he hopes that complete peace in Sarajevo would be restored in the foreseeable future.

Muslims, Serbs Agree on 'Blue Roads' in Sarajevo

LD1703201794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1857 GMT 17 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Sarajevo, Mar 17 (TANJUG)—Serbs and Moslems agreed on Thursday at Sarajevo Airport to open up so-called "blue roads" for the civilian population and humanitarian supplies in the area of the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ravaged by a 23-month-old war.

The agreement was signed by the speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik, and the deputy prime minister of the Moslem government in Sarajevo, Husan Muratovic, at a U.N. sponsored meeting.

The agreement provides for opening the road which links Sarajevo and Visoko via Vogosca, corridors linking the Sarajevo Serb suburbs of Lukavica and Ilidza with Sarajevo's Moslem suburbs of Dobrinja and Butmir as well as the bridge linking the suburb of Grbavica with the Moslem part of Novo Sarajevo.

The agreement is to take effect on March 23 and U.N. peace-keepers deployed in Sarajevo are to supervise its implementation.

A ceasefire has been in force between Serb and Moslem forces in the Sarajevo area since February 10. They have withdrawn their heavy weapons from an area 20 kilometers in radius around Sarajevo or placed them under U.N. control.

UN Envoy on Agreement

AU1703153994 Paris AFP in English 1523 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 17 (AFP)—The Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs on Thursday signed an agreement to open roads and partially lift the siege of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo, a UN special envoy announced.

Under the UN-sponsored agreement, Sarajevo will be linked by road to central Bosnia-Herzegovina via the Moslem majority town of Visoko (25 kilometres, or 15 miles) to the west, UN special envoy Sergio Vieria de Mello stated.

Other road corridors will be opened to link Sarajevo's Serb-held suburbs of Ilidza and Lukavica, on the one hand, and the Moslem suburbs of Butmir and Dobrinja on the other.

A bridge between the Serb-held Grbavica district in downtown Sarajevo and the rest of the capital will also be opened under the accord signed at Sarajevo airport.

The agreement, whose signing was twice postponed will take effect from Tuesday and concerns the resumption of civilian traffic for humanitarian and business purposes.

The text was signed in Vieira de Mello's presence by Hasan Muratovic, the Bosnian minister responsible for relations with the United Nations, and the main Bosnian Serb negotiator Momcilo Krajisnik.

When it takes effect, Sarajevo will be connected with the outside world, though only partially, for the first time in almost two years of siege by the Bosnian Serbs.

The UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) is responsible for organising and monitoring implementation of the accord.

Civilians wishing to use the reopened roads will be able to do so, by bus, to the extent of one return trip per day, after notifying UNPROFOR personnel 24 hours in advance.

The UN force would then notify competent authorities representing the warring parties of the lists of passengers.

Sarajevo Radio Reports 'Significant' Serb Losses

AU1703155594

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1400 GMT on 17 March carries in its regular 39-minute newscast the following reports about the fighting in the republic.

Bihac correspondent Mirza Sadikovic reports that "Karadzic's terrorists are using Vis, howitzers, and tanks to shell the defense lines on the entire Bihac front, particularly in the areas of Sokolac, Orljanska, and Ribicka Glavica. After unsuccessful attempts at infiltrating subversion groups, the aggressor launched a new fierce artillery and tank attack at Grabez, [name indistinct], and Hasin Vrh. The defenders also came under fierce infantry attacks, and the fighting is still in progress. The members of the paramilitary formations of the so-called Kladusa autonomy also attacked the defenders in the areas on Litkovac and Pecigrad in the Cazin Municipality, which confirms anticipations of a fresh, joint attack on the free Bihac territory."

Amira Salibasic reports from Olovo and says that "early this morning, the chetniks began their attack using tanks and mortars, which continues this afternoon. The defense positions of our troops on all parts of the long Olovo front are being (?pounded) by howitzer and mortar shells. There are small arms' provocations along the entire demarcation lines."

The studio announcer says that "the afternoon hours in the 7-South Operative Group operational zone are somewhat calmer," and introduces a report by correspondent Mirudin Aldobasic who says that "the reason for this are the enemy's significant losses in manpower and equipment. The criminal Mladic and his henchmen can no longer motivate their troops, so they are employing

extremely repressive measures toward the population in the occupied Doboj and Teslic. They are mobilizing all Serb nationals up to age 55, but they are also mobilizing Muslims and Croats [words indistinct]. It is evident that some Serb nationals are avoiding mobilization, so the prisons are overflowing."

Correspondent Sead Custovic reports from the 1st Corps Information Service and says that "small arms' provocations were registered very early [this morning], and they intensified through the day. Brijesce was targeted from Bozica Kuca, and Varazdin Street was targeted from Devino Brdo, which resulted in the wounding of one civilian. [Words indistinct] where four portable rocket launcher shells exploded."

UN: French Soldier Not Killed by Serbs

AU1703142194 Paris AFP in English 1401 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] Zagreb, March 17 (AFP)—A French soldier killed in the northwestern Bosnian town of Bihac was probably the victim of a Moslem sniper, Matthew Nerzig, spokesman for the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], said here Thursday.

"No final conclusion has yet been reached, so I would point out that based on our preliminary investigations, it is our judgement that the shot that killed Corporal Stephane Dubrulle on March 11 did not come from the Bosnian Serb side," Nerzig said.

"In fact, we do have indications on a preliminary basis that the shot does seem to have come from the Bosnian Moslem side."

Dubrulle was the 19th French soldier killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning of the war. A total of 79 UN peacekeepers have died in the 23-month war.

Croat, Muslim Agreement on POW Exchange

LD1803130694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 18 Mar 94

[Report by correspondent Zdenko Vranjes]

[Excerpt] Following lengthy talks late last night, Croat and Muslim Bosniak representatives in Gornji Vakuf signed a final agreement on the release and exchange of POW's on an all-for-all principle. The implementation of the agreement is to start tomorrow, when the Muslim side is to release 73 Croatian Defense Council [HVO] members from a prison in the eastern part of Mostar and 294 Croats from a prison in Bugojno, while the Croat side will simultaneously release 500 Muslim detainees from Rodoc near Mostar.

Two Muslim army helicopters that have been kept in Medjugorje are to be returned to the Muslim side tomorrow, or after they have been serviced.

The second part of the agreement envisages that isolated persons—civilians—should be relocated on Tuesday, 22 March. This refers to several hundred Muslims from Rotilje near Kiseljak and Croats from the French UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] base in Catici near Kakanj. It has been agreed that on Tuesday the Muslim side should release six POW's from Gornji Vakuf, while the Croat side should release all prisoners from Ljubuski, Capljina, Prozor, and a heliport near Mostar.

It has also been agreed that Croat and Muslim representatives will meet again on Thursday [24 March], which is the deadline for the preparation of an exchange of all the POW's held by both sides in the area of central Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Britain's Major Arrives in Split

AU1703203394 Paris AFP in English 2014 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] Zagreb, March 17 (AFP)—British Prime Minister John Major arrived in the southern Croatian port of Split late Thursday [17 March], stopping over before a visit to the Bosnian capital Sarajevo on Friday, witnesses said.

Major, who will be making his first visit to the Bosnian capital, is going to Sarajevo to show his support for the British general commanding UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a spokesman for Major's office said in London.

Major will meet Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose in Sarajevo, and will also travel to the central Bosnian town of Vitez—headquarters of British UN troops serving in Bosnia—the spokesman said.

In Split, Major was expected to meet Yasushi Akashi, special representative of UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, said a spokesman for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

Major's visit comes a week after London announced it would send an 900 more soldiers to the former Yugoslavia, bringing to more than 3,000 the number of troops it has in the region.

Britain is the second largest contributor, behind France, to UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur on Sunday visited the north-western Bosnian town of Bihac.

Major visited Bosnia previously in late 1992.

Earlier Thursday, a UN special envoy announced that the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs had signed an agreement to open roads and partially lift the two-year-old siege of Sarajevo.

Commentary Views Aspects of Federation Accord

AU1703200594 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 94 p 1

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "Soldiers Surpassed Politicians"]

[Text] The future Bosniak-Croat federation will have an integral defense system. That unequivocally follows on the agreement signed by General Rasim Delic and General Ante Roso on Saturday [12 March] in Split. Their signatures will, hopefully, finally bring an end to Muslim-Croat conflicts and disputes. It is significant that it took less time for the soldiers to reach an agreement than for the politicians who negotiated in Vienna, although the agreement between the two generals is in compliance with the work of the participants at the Vienna talks.

Naturally, it was easy for the soldiers to surpass the politicians, for they discussed a narrow segment of the broader mutual relations between the Bosniak Muslims and the Croats, but the difficult part was to disregard the series of conflicts, the wounded and the dead, to suppress frustration resulting from mutual shelling. Geostrategically speaking, the defense system of the Bosniak-Croat federation will definitely mean a lot for broad general relations in these parts. The United States was evidently extremely interested in reaching the agreement and they almost pushed General Roso and General Delic to end the negotiations successfully. However, it is also obvious that the first officers of the two military forces wisely realized that mutual Muslim-Croat conflicts cannot benefit either nation and that they directly benefit the third side. Still, considering the possibility of reaching a lasting political solution on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the signed agreement clearly says that its defense system does not aim at harming the third side. Simply, the two nations which will live in the federation are trying to define clearly the question of defense, which is an extremely important one for every country, especially for the one which rises anew from the ashes of the war.

There is no doubt that the United States will insist exactly on the military-defense plan of the future Bosniak-Croat federation, for in any option of the future course of events, it could guarantee a successful resistance to those who want to use weapons to impose political solutions. Of course, in order to implement the agreement signed by Generals Delic and Roso, it will be necessary to suppress the frustration and forget bad memories, and that will take time, but one can go forward only if one looks toward the future, not toward the past.

Gligorov Stresses Country's Position in Europe

AU1603192494 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 16 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Macedonia for European Option"]

[Text] "The Balkans' European integration is a key factor for the peace and stability, not only of the region, but of entire Europe, as well. No attempts for forced changes of borders and legalization of methods of ethnic cleansing must be allowed," President Gligorov stated during this year's Third European Dialogue Conference, speaking on the subject "The Road to Europe—Too Many Conflicts." The conference was attended by Germany's top level scientists and politicians and a part of its diplomatic corps. Gligorov especially stressed the necessity of technical, financial, and other forms of aid for countries in transition. For developed Europe, this is a safest investment in a social peace and democracy on the continent. Macedonia's long-lasting determination is a process of European integration of the Balkans, and its place in it. That is why, Gligorov added, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] insists on neighborly relations, cooperation, and inviolability of present borders of all Balkan countries. With Greece, we want to go into the future, and not some 2,000 years in the past, President Gligorov said. The one-sided embargo of this country is a threat to the stability in the region and worsens the social and economic situation in Macedonia, Gligorov ended.

Slovenian President Milan Kucan was also present at the conference, which was led by Bundestag's President Mrs. Rita Suessmuth. Mr. Kucan, who also pointed out his country's determination for an European option, answered participants' questions together with Mr. Gligorov. The Greek-Macedonian relations were in the focus of interest. Answering the questions Gligorov said: "The problem is irrational and of an emotional nature. The Balkan is too preoccupied with its history. The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial aspirations. It is ready to continue the dialogue with Greece, but without any ultimatums, accompanied by embargoes." President Gligorov requested that EU puts pressure on its member Greece, which is trying to solve problems through one-sided and illegal acts.

During his meeting with President Kucan, Mr. Gligorov discussed bilateral issues and the problems in the region.

Yesterday afternoon, President Gligorov was received by Germany's President Richard von Weiszecker. Among other things, they also discussed the dispute with Greece. The German president was interested in a way his country could help Macedonia to overcome this problem, emphasizing the Greek embargo is completely unacceptable.

President Gligorov also visited the Macedonian Embassy in Bonn.

Government on Liabilities to International Banks

AU1603191894 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 16 Mar 94

[Unattributed report: "Government Session"]

[Text] The Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government adopted the law on settlement of debts toward international institutions. According to this law, the firms will pay their 60 million denars debt owed to the international bank to the state instead. They are to settle the debt in eight years, with a grace period of three years and an annual interest rate of six percent, paid in five equal rates, starting from 31 March 1997.

The government also adopted the proposed law on changes in existing law on administrative taxes. This law balances administrative services taxes, including the state's diplomatic and consular representative offices abroad, with the predicted annual inflation of 70 percent.

Government members postponed the discussion on the law on census as the Statistics Institute submitted an incomplete financial report. The institute only informs of approved finances for the census procedure, but no formal confirmation has been received by any international financial institution so far. The census is evaluated to cost about $2.2 million and if the financial side is not settled in due time, it is hard to expect it will take place in June as planned.

Debate on Transforming State-Funded Companies

AU1803111194 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 17 Mar 94 p 3

[Report by S. Kiridjievska: "There Is No Free Privatization"]

[Text] Will trade in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] transform itself painlessly or will it go in the directions it has started—street trade, poor-quality goods, and jumbled assortment? These were the points on which yesterday's debate concentrated, on the subject: "Transformation of trading companies with state capital," held in Skopje and organized by the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce and the Transformation Agency. Besides scientists, it was also attended by a large number of outstanding economists from the commercial sphere.

"We wanted to urge another initiative for faster transition, organization, and ownership restructuring in trade, as the priority task for the creation of new relations, which should lead to overcoming the present situation," the introductory speaker Duse Kotevski, vice president of the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce, said. While numbering the basic statistical indications about the real image of the situation in this economic branch, Kotevski located the roots of the problems in commerce. He said it was harmful to start liberalization without adequate

solutions and organization, with illegal activities and disloyal competition. In concluding that the number of the legal subjects engaged in trade has significantly increased, he said that the modern shops with rich variety, catalogue sale, shopping centers, discount shops, and modern warehouses with terminal cashiers had been replaced by ugly sights in the streets, whose consequences will be long felt.

According to Ariton Zivkov, professor at the Faculty of Economics, there was no recipe for the complex process of transformation, however only those who were really interested in becoming tradesmen would be able to attain it. In his opinion this process in trade did not begin with Ante Markovic's law, but started the moment sales were completed with postponed payment in conditions of high inflation. One should not forget the small trading companies supplied themselves from the state companies by postponing the payment of debts, and sometimes not paying at all. At the same time, the state sector, according to Zivkov, had to meet the requirements of the state, contrary to the private sector, which piled up its capital. Calling this manner of privatization forced, Professor Zivkov explained he was doing his best to save resources. In his opinion, there would be no real transformation in trade without real efficiency, finance, personnel shifts, selection, and regional orientation, because trade can drive the economy only if it is given a chance.

Recalling some clarifications of the law on transformation, Miroljub Sukarov, manager of the Transformation Agency, said that priority could be given to nobody. "The process must begin with the concept of paid privatization, because our country is not rich, and there is no such thing as free privatization. If we do not form a body of financial resources, the social tensions will not be prevented, and the state must have money to maintain social peace. The law on transformation divides the companies into those that have, and those that have not started privatization, and it has to end in a period of two years." These were the words of professor Aleksandar Nikolovski from the Faculty of Economics. We must not wait and play tactics in transforming ourselves, because we are getting close to a deeper abyss.

Bobek Suklev, professor at the Economics Faculty provocatively started his discussion by saying, "I shall start my job by giving assessments with the question of whether the company is yours, that is, whether you can prove it is your property. From previous experience I know that companies do not have such proof at their disposal and that will slow down the process of privatization. Thus, the assessment will have to be based on experience, on the feeling for each particular situation, and on the basis of a subjective evaluation."

Joining the discussion, the economists showed interest in the fate of the shareholders' capital, the prohibition on selling objects with a value of over 50,000 German marks, as well as in putting a mortgage on objects when there is no capital turnover. They stated that it would be a great and unforgiving sin if this state took liquidation as the only prospect for the former state industry, but that would be inevitable if four conditions were not fulfilled. They are: a rigorous decrease in the gray economy, equal working conditions, an alteration to the Law on office space, computerization, but also a true division between the private and the state sectors.

[Box, p 3]

Seminar on Privatization

Today and tomorrow a seminar will be held at the Faculty of Law with privatization as the subject. There will be 12 lecturers, nine of which are eminent professors of the Faculty of Law, and three are professors of the Faculty of Economics. Jane Miljovski, minister in the Macedonian Government, and Sofia Todorova, Minister of Development, will also present their views. The discussions will be concentrated on the privatization of state companies with 100 percent state capital that have not yet started the process of transformation according to the old laws.

—by V.C.

Drnovsek Calls Kucan Allegations 'Paranoid'

LD1503211794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2021 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] Ljubljana, March 15 (TANJUG)—Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek of Slovenia and his closest aides have denied President Milan Kucan's allegations that illegal para-intelligence services operate in the republic and termed the allegations "paranoid."

"According to the information gathered and checked so far, there is no evidence of the existence of illegal intelligence services," a statement issued on Tuesday by the so-called political coordination, headed by Drnovsek, said.

The government thus refuted Kucan's statement that "para-intelligence services in Slovenia keep under surveillance top state officials, some journalists, and other eminent personalities, and are ready to liquidate them."

The Slovene prime minister and his aides also rejected Kucan's statements in the more recent months about the nascent fascism and other negative phenomena in Slovenia, including mounting corruption, disqualifications of politicians and the like.

Kucan on February 16 officially informed Drnovsek and parliament President Herman Rigelnik that he had reliable information that Defence Minister Janez Jansa was plotting a state coup.

No coup has been staged, but the government has failed to provide any thorough explanation of the case, which is most likely at the core of the so-called intelligence misunderstandings between the president and the prime minister's most reliable team.

Slovenia has in the meantime grown more risky for foreign investors, according to the latest poll conducted by the prestigious financial review Euromoney.

Confidence in Slovenia's economy and economic policy is at its lowest since the republic seceded from the former Yugoslav Federation.

The confidence will further be eroded by a continued drop in the anyway inadequate foreign capital investments, and, as economic experts set out, the too slow implementation of reforms and the country's excessively high debt to a consortium of foreign banks.

Peterle, UN Officials Discuss Arms Embargo

AU1503181794 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 15 Mar 94

[Text] Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle on his way back from Chile—where he attended the inauguration of President Eduardo Frei—stopped over in New York last night. Uros Lipuscek reports about his talks at the UN Headquarters:

[Begin Lipuscek recording] Last night's talks between Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle and French Ambassador to the United Nations Jean-Bernard Merimee, who is presiding over the UN Security Council this month, and Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations Raoul [name indistinct], president of the UN Sanctions Committee, have proven that, at the moment, there is no chance of the UN Security Council exempting Slovenia from the arms embargo.

The president of the UN Security Council, according to Peterle, showed understanding for the Slovene views and proposed that the Slovene diplomacy continue the debate concerning this problem with the leading members of the UN Security Council. The Slovene foreign minister said that after the signing of the Partnership for Peace agreement, which we recently signed with NATO, and a successful development of the U.S. diplomatic action for the solution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, some objections toward Slovenia have disappeared in this sense.

Because of all this, the Slovene foreign minister believes that we are on a good way to having the UN Security Council exempt Slovenia from the arms embargo; however, one cannot specify exactly when that will happen.

In the UN Security Council, Russia and Great Britain are categorically opposed to Slovenia's exemption from the embargo, while the French position is unclear. At a time when Russia is evidently still not ready to fully support the latest U.S. diplomatic initiative for solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there seems to be absolutely no chance of Russia agreeing to, for example, the exemption of Slovenia from this embargo. Slovenia will stay on the former Yugoslavia train regarding weapons purchases until the superpowers have agreed on a uniform policy in the Balkans—that is, when the solution for the Balkan crisis is in sight. That, despite the latest U.S. initiative, is still not in sight. That was also confirmed by last night's talks of Slovene Foreign Minister Peterle at UN Headquarters. [end recording]

Peterle Views Results of Visit to UN, Chile

AU1703163894 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle at today's news conference spoke about the results of a recent visit to Chile and New York. He also replied to some of the questions concerning relations with Croatia. Nadja Pengov has more details about the news conference:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] The visit to Chile was of political and economic nature and was successful in both aspects, as Foreign Minister Peterle says. The partners displayed interest in the new markets in Europe and Slovenia can play an important role as a sort of service in this function. Great interest in the economic cooperation with Slovenia was also expressed by the Chilean economics minister. The talks that the economic part of the

Slovene delegation held with the representatives of the association of industrialists were also successful.

The foreign minister will again visit Latin America in May. On that occasion he will go to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay where he will sign several economic agreements.

The purpose of the visit and the talks at the UN Headquarters in New York was, according to the minister, to accelerate the lifting of the arms embargo for our country. The partner in talks was French Ambassador Merimee who is presiding over the UN Security Council this month.

[Peterle] Mr. Merimee was pleased with this meeting and said that new circumstances and new reasons have emerged for Slovenia to be exempt from the embargo. However, he saw no possibility of this happening immediately, that is to say, very soon. He believes that the action should be pursued further on this basis. Judging by these talks I believe that we are actually considerably closer to this solution than we used to be.

[Pengov] The opinion of the Brazilian ambassador to the UN, who is the head of the UN Sanctions Committee, was similar. He promised that his commission will act in a way so as not to hurt Slovenia. Now to other issues:

Bearing in mind that the second meeting of the Slovene-Croatian border commission was scheduled to take place today and that the meeting did not materialize, the foreign minister, when asked about the reasons, replied that the postponement had been proposed by the Slovene side. The reason?

[Peterle] There is no new basis for the work of the commission because the Croatian part of the expert group, that is to say, the geodesists, do not show any willingness to continue searching for a common solution for those sections of the state border for which consensus has not been reached yet.

Let me say that the fact that the Croatian Post and Telecommunications public enterprise without any prior warning, let alone consent, redirected the telephone lines of some subscribers on the territory which is within the land registry district of Secovlje does not have a positive effect, also in connection with the work of this commission.

[Pengov] What about the refugees moving out of the Slovene holiday homes in Istria? The owners of the holiday homes rejected the request to extend the deadline for their stay and the deadline will thus have to be observed as it was agreed. [end recording]

Chamber Session Examines Old SFRY Debts

AU1603180094 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Bojan Veselinovic report on the 16 March extraordinary session of the State Chamber]

[Excerpts] [Begin recording] [Veselinovic] Among those invited to attend today's extraordinary session about the Slovene public debt and the relations with a consortium of commercial banks, parliamentary Chairman Herman Rigelnik listed government ministers, the director of the Agency for the Rehabilitation of Banks, and the director of the Slovene Social Accounting Service. Beside Marjan Podobnik, who spoke in the name of the proposers of the extraordinary session, Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari, National Bank of Slovenia Governor Dr. France Arhar, and Janko Dezelak from the Agency for Rehabilitation of Banks, have spoken so far. Let us take is a step at a time:

Marjan Podobnik said that it is imperative to identify all forms of incurring debts to find out what we are obliged to pay and what not. Podobnik expressed belief that our negotiations do not observe the provisions of the Constitutional Law, that is to say, they only observe it partially, while they neglect the division of assets, that is to say, the property of former Yugoslavia. Here he demanded:

[Podobnik] To establish the identity of each credit separately, namely, who incurred what credit, who spent it for what purpose, and who is the true debtor.

[Veselinovic] In the continuation, he, among other things, criticized the government for not sending an original contract about reprogramming debts from the end of the eighties to the deputies. Podobnik also said that he was not opposed to the model of financial rehabilitation of banks, but objected to fictitious debts and their doubling. He also said that a foreign auditing house has audited the Ljubljana Bank, however, with a remark that it could not carry out the audit in compliance with international standards. [passage omitted]

Regarding Podobnik's question about the actual height of the public debt first, Finance Minister Gaspari, in an expose that followed, said that the well-known estimate [6.5 billion German marks] is based on the data available by the end of 1993. Regarding the trade in debts, that is to say, the early purchase of debts, he said that the legislation in old Yugoslavia at that time allowed this and that this is a legitimate practice internationally, however, the creditors are not interested in this trade. The key issue for them is who has taken out the debt.

Gaspari said that the government is not opposed to Podobnik's proposal for the revision of the credit agreements that led to the public debt. Regarding the share of the entire old Yugoslav debt that Slovenia should repay to the commercial banks, Gaspari said that the good 16 percent that we managed to agree in the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund is an example to all other debtors, because:

[Gaspari] The decision of the International Monetary Fund that became a law in Slovenia is the first international action that recognized Slovenia as a successor to the former Yugoslavia. How? Simply, because Slovenia in that document split the share of the former Yugoslavia

in the active and passive part of the balance sheet of the International Monetary Fund. That is why it was such an important precedent. Slovenia is also using it now, as it has also been approved by the Badinter Commission, which is not a negligible institution within the Geneva talks.

[Veselinovic] [Passage omitted] According to Gaspari, the views of the proposers of the session resemble the views of the negotiators from the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Namely, there is no guarantee that we will manage to get a better position in the succession negotiations than we enjoy now that we have decided to break free completely from the finance system of the former Yugoslavia.

Governor France Arhar, too, said that this decision was without an alternative:

[Arhar] What is the alternative to the negotiations with the creditors? The alternative to the negotiations with the creditors is negotiations with the debtors.

[Veselinov] Those of you who oppose the negotiations, Arhar concluded, should bear in mind that according to the credit agreements everything but mines and defense systems qualifies for confiscation.

Janko Dezelak, in the name of the Agency for the Rehabilitation of Banks, said that incrimination of the state-assumed debts of weak companies is an expression of the lack of knowledge about these problems.

A debate of the deputies, which will be partially closed to the public, is envisaged to take place after the expose by Janez Kopac. The parliament is currently in recess. [end recording]

Further on Session

AU1703092594 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 16 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Since early this afternoon, the State Chamber has been discussing the Slovene public debt and Slovenia's strategy in the negotiations with a consortium of commercial banks at an extraordinary session convened at the request of a group of 25 deputies. After the initial appearance by Marjan Podobnik, who spoke in the name of the proposers of the session, and the representatives of the monetary and financial authorities, who called for the continuation of negotiations with the foreign debtors, the parliamentary debate followed. During the debate, the finance minister, the governor of the National Bank of Slovenia, and other representatives of the legal organs took the floor on several occasions.

The session was interrupted half an hour ago and it will continue behind closed doors. In the closed part of the session the deputies are to discuss the negotiating positions in the talks with the consortium of commercial banks, which have not ended yet. The last one to speak before the interruption was Finance Minister Gaspari, who explained that the purchase of debts prior to their falling due would be nonsensical, as we would not receive confirmation that we had actually purchased them. Here is a report by Vesna Burnik:

[Begin recording] [Burnik] [passage omitted] The debate proceeded in the well-known direction—retorts and mutual accusations followed each other that the opposition was politicizing the public debt for its own purposes and vice-versa, that the ruling parties were pretending to be smart and the exclusive experts on the public debt.

The stumbling block was evidently the question as to when and how Slovenia actually agreed to the payment of at least a portion of the former SFRY debt and what the basis for it is. Governor Franc Arhar replied:

[Arhar] For the time being the declarative document, if I may say so, is the Constitutional Law that was passed in June. The law provides for the willingness and undertaking. At that time, everybody, the government and the parliament, whenever the issue surfaced and, of course, also last January, if you recall, when the parliament was passing the law about the membership in the International Monetary Fund [IMF] [sentence as heard]. When the IMF initiated the procedure regarding Slovenia, in establishing its share, it, of course, departed from the stipulation, from that very clear article of the Constitutional Law.

[Burnik] In the debate Marjan Poljsak demanded to know why Slovenia was not purchasing its portion of the debt if it really was so cheap at this moment. Minister Gaspari replied that the debts would not disappear with their purchase, because since the disintegration of Yugoslavia the creditors have not recognized the transactions, and the National Bank of Yugoslavia, of course, would not sign them off. The Ljubljana Bank used to do that, too, until the disintegration of the country. A more detailed debate on the topic will continue in the closed part of the session. [end recording]

Federal

Chamber of Citizens Adopts 1994 Federal Budget

LD1703183294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1503 GMT 17 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 17 Mar (TANJUG)—After a debate lasting several days, the federal parliament's Chamber of Citizens today adopted the federal budget for 1994 totalling 1,675 million dinars (the new Yugoslav dinar is officially pegged to the German mark at a 1:1 ratio). [passage omitted]

As far as expenditures are concerned, most of the funds (around 75 percent) have been allocated for the needs of the Yugoslav Army, the federal bodies (around 11 percent) and veterans' benefits (around 7 percent). [passage omitted]

Serbia

New Government, Prime Minister Elected

LD1803003294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0001 GMT 18 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, 17 Mar (TANJUG)—The Serbian Parliament this evening elected a new republican government with Mirko Marjanovic as prime minister. Of the 224 deputies present, 128 voted for Marjanovic's cabinet, 77 were against, and 30 abstained. The government was elected in a public vote after a debate lasting three days in which 135 deputies took part. The new Serbian Government consists of the prime minister, five deputy prime ministers, 20 department ministers, and four ministers without portfolio.

Kosovo

Ethnic Albanian Leader Welcomes Federation

LD1803115894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1056 GMT 18 Mar 94

[Text] Pristina, 18 Mar (TANJUG)—Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [Demokratski Savez Kosova, DSK], today welcomed the signing of the agreement on the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At a news conference Rugova described the agreement as the first step toward containing the situation and a peaceful resolution of the conflict, at the same time warning that developments will be more difficult on the ground [than in the negotiations] due to war wounds.

According to him the question is whether similar things will happen in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, since, as he said, it [former Yugoslavia] should first be reorganized according to ethnic and political criteria. Rugova said different and new ways of [implementing] the agreement could not be ruled out. He voiced his party's position whereby first of all each one [each nation] should be a master in its own home, and then economic and other associations will be possible.

The DSK president expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the discussion on Kosovo in the Belgian Parliament, in particular with Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes's speech, in which, according to Rugova, he had said that Kosovo Albanians were now no longer satisfied with the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 [that gave them the status of an autonomous province within Serbia]. The DSK leader interpreted this as a sign of support for the [ethnic] Albanian demand for an independent and neutral Kosovo.

Rugova welcomed recent demonstrations of Albanians in European cities and confirmed that the organizers were the DSK and other Albanian associations.